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Abstract
This thesis consists of three independent chapters, related by a common theme: the role of
education in the macroeconomy.
The first chapter considers the role of higher education policies in intergenerational mobility.
Student loans and grants increase the possibilities for low-income students to attend college
and earn high incomes later in life. For that reason, they are commonly assumed to increase
intergenerational mobility. Instead, the chapter shows that education policies have another
effect, working in the opposite direction: they reduce the relative importance of other com-
ponents of earnings such as luck, while those components are a greater source of mobility.
Which of the two effects dominates is an empirical question. To that end, the chapter devel-
ops and parameterizes a model of the markets for higher education and labor. The results
show a trade-off between welfare and intergenerational mobility.
The second chapter connects two disparate strands of literature on earnings inequality. On
the one hand, skill-biased technological change describes how general equilibrium effects be-
tween different types of workers shape the income distribution. On the other, the literature
on taxation suggests that incentives to accumulate human capital drive the earnings dis-
tribution. The chapter combines both approaches, underpinned by an empirical analysis of
occupational skill data. It finds that incentive changes in taxation like those that occurred
in the second half of the 20th century can lead to polarization of the labor market.
The third chapter really concerns education in economics, rather than education in the
economy. It analyses the completion times of students in top European PhD programs. These
are comparable to their counterparts in the United States, with a median that is approaching
six years and a higher average. The publication of the present thesis helps counter the trend.
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Chapter 1
Higher Education Policies and
Intergenerational Mobility
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Overview
Intergenerational mobility is considered a key macroeconomic variable. It measures how much
children differ from their parents, on average. This tells us to what extent one’s outcomes
in life depend on circumstances at birth. Intergenerational mobility in economic terms is
typically measured by labor earnings. The less children’s earnings are related to those of
their parents, the more mobile a society is.
Recent empirical work suggests that higher education is key to understanding the causes of
intergenerational mobility. Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, and Yagan (2017) find that there
is a strong correlation between parental earnings and child earnings for the United States
as a whole (a rank-rank correlation of 0.288). But this correlation is much smaller when
including college fixed effects (0.100), i.e. a child’s earnings are almost unrelated to that of
their parent once we know what college the child goes to. This is found to be true irrespective
of the type of college. Figure 1.1 illustrates the analysis.1 The findings by Chetty et al. add to
1These are measures of persistence of earnings across generations, which are the inverse of mobility: the
lower intergenerational persistence, the higher intergenerational mobility. Chetty et al. combine data from
federal income tax returns and from the Department of Education to link information on the earnings of
two generations to their educational choices, and the characteristics of colleges they attend. These data are
available for individuals from the 1980-1982 birth cohorts. In 2014, the time of the last earnings measurement,
children of those cohorts were in their early 30s, at which point measures of intergenerational earnings
persistence typically stabilize. Parental income is defined as average parental earnings when the children are
9
an established literature that suggests human capital is the main culprit in intergenerational
mobility, and that once we understand educational outcomes we will largely understand
intergenerational earnings persistence.
Figure 1.1: Controlling for Colleges
Graphs are created by fitting a straight line with slope equal to the IGE estimate through the point (50,50).
Chetty et al. also document intergenerational mobility by type of college. Specifically, they
calculate the proportion of students in each college that comes from a low income background,
defined as a family income in the bottom 20%. This is then seen as a measure of access to
the college. Next, they find the proportion of students from a low income family that reach
the top 20% of the income distribution, which they take as a measure of a college’s success
in generating mobility. Finally, the product of these two is the share of students in a college
that comes from a bottom 20% family and reaches the top 20%. This is a measure of mobility.
Figure 1.2 displays these measures per college, first by a measure of average student ability
on the left, and then by a measure of educational investment on the right. To emphasize the
absolute value of the probability measures, all graphs have a common vertical axis. Access
decreases as a college enrolls students with higher average SAT scores, or as it spends more
on instructional expenditures. At the same time, the success of those students that do attend
aged 15 to 19, and child income is measured over the year 2014. The college a student was enrolled in longest
counts as the college that the student attended. Their preferred measure of intergenerational persistence are
rank-rank regressions of parental and child earnings. (Both parents and children are assigned a rank within
their own distribution. Then, child rank is regressed on parental rank. This procedure is the same as the
Spearman correlation, but additionally allows for the inclusion of controls, such as college attended.)
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increases. As a result, mobility across colleges is remarkably flat and low. In short, college
heterogeneity appears to be an important part of the story. These findings also suggest
that higher education policies may have an important role to play: policies help low-income
students pay for college, and college expenditures seem to propel them upward in the earnings
distribution.
Figure 1.2: Access, Success, and Mobility in the Data
Each point represents a college. Linear fit included for emphasis. Only 4-year private colleges are included,
and those who report instructional expenditures per student above $40,000 are excluded as outliers.
Data from Chetty et al. (2017).
Building on these insights, this paper develops a theory of the persistence of labor earnings
across generations, paying special attention for the role of higher education. The theory is
parameterized to represent the United States economy in the early 2000s, and used to explore
the relationship between higher education policies and intergenerational mobility.
The main result is the following: higher education policies, such as student grants and loans,
actually increase the persistence of earnings, thereby reducing intergenerational mobility.
11
To understand why this may be so, we start by looking at the sources of labor earnings.
The macroeconomic literature on labor earnings identifies two main sources of gross wages.
First, wages depend on one’s skills, often referred to as human capital. Human capital is part
innate ability, and part learned through education or on the job. Second, wages also depend
on idiosyncratic shocks to income: careers do not aways follow straight lines, and neither do
the earnings derived from them.
The common assumption that policies increase mobility revolves around human capital.
Building human capital costs money that the children of the poor may not have. Education
policies pay for expensive colleges, therefore allowing smart children from poor families to
earn more than their parents.
But this story ignores the role of luck. Human capital tends to persist over generations, as
children inherit their parent’s ability. If earnings where only due to human capital, earnings
would be much more persistent than what we observe in data. Idiosyncratic shocks to income,
on the other hand, mix up outcomes. The relative importance of these two components,
together with their level, determines overall mobility.
So why do policies reduce the intergenerational mobility of earnings? By enabling human
capital investment, they make human capital a relatively more important component of
earnings, and reduce the role of randomness. Put simply, they turn an economy driven by
luck into an economy driven by ability. The latter economy, however, exhibits much less
intergenerational mobility.
Key to this result is to establish the relative importance of the two competing channels, and
the effect higher education policies have on them. That requires a model that can generate
counter-factual states of the world. This paper builds such a model. The below outlines how
I ensure that all of the model’s effect sizes are driven by relevant data or previous empirical
research.
First, the model needs to take into account the behavior of institutions of higher education.
To this end, the paper describes a theory of competitive colleges that translate spending in
human capital investment one-to-one, and argues why this view of colleges is appropriate for
the question at hand.
Second, it needs to account for the effectiveness of higher education. At the core of this lie
questions of causality: how important is time and money invested in higher education versus
ability? How does this differ by college selectiveness? And how much value does college add
versus going to work straight away? Quasi-experimental results on college effectiveness from
Hoxby (2016a) help to discipline the model in this respect.
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Third, it needs to make sense of who joins which institution, which means taking into ac-
count, amongst other matters, financial constraints and government policies. Therefore, pub-
lic colleges, grants, and student loans are all modeled. The availability of grants is directly
estimated from survey data. Regarding student loans, the paper relies on previous work by
a number of authors who study financial constraints in college financing. In particular, the
paper follows Abbott et al. (2013) in the sources of financing it considers and its model of
the US student loan system.
Fourth, because earnings persistence is measured at a later point in life, it needs to account
for different components of earnings and their path over the adult life cycle. Here, the paper
follows the approach taken by Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011). It uses a human capital
production function to match the hump-shaped life-cycle of earnings, as well as the growing
variance of earnings across members of a cohort as they grow older. It also adds idiosyncratic
income shocks and a labor-leisure choice to human capital. Extensive literatures exist on
either of these two components of earnings, which are used to quantify their dynamics and
importance.
Fifth and final, links between generations need to be accounted for. These links come in three
parts. First, test scores of matched pairs of parents and children are used to quantify the
intergenerational persistence of learning ability. The paper does not advocate that approach
per se, although that has been done elsewhere. Instead it rests at demonstrating that the
overall model makes accurate predictions with regards to the intergenerational persistence
of earnings. Notably, this is so without targeting these figures at any point in the param-
eterization of the model. Second, inter-vivos transfers from parents to children which help
to finance college can be observed in the data. They mostly appear to take place on the
basis of need, and are therefore modeled and quantified as such. Third, grants and loans are
sometimes dependent on family income status. Such grants and loans are modeled explicitly.
A credible parameterization of the model is only possible due to recent empirical advances.
Two pieces of evidence stand out in particular, both combining large sets of data from
administrative sources. Work by Chetty et al. (2017) provides several results on mobility by
colleges which serve to inform the role of higher education more generally. Hoxby (2016a)
uses discontinuities at admissions thresholds to infer the causal effect of higher education
spending on earnings later in life. Because she uses administrative data on applications,
admissions, and earnings, her work provides these results for the entire spectrum of colleges.
These findings are key ingredients to the present work, which combines them with further
data on higher education and the labor market.
It has already been mentioned that the the parameterization of the model does not target any
measures of intergenerational persistence, so that these can be used to assess the model’s
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validity. We will also see that the model presented in this paper reproduces the patterns
found by Chetty et al. Further to that, the model also has a number of implications regarding
college entry, college heterogeneity, the sources of college financing, and several components
of labor earnings, none of which are targeted as part of the parameterization of the model.
The paper compares these implications to data, and argues that the model represents these
aspects well. In the process, the paper shows that a human capital-based model can explain
the facts on intergenerational mobility.
The main result of this paper has several implications. To begin, it shows a direct trade-off
between classical welfare measures and intergenerational mobility. As a result, it may not be
wise for policy makers to use higher education policies to target intergenerational mobility.
Next, one should be careful when comparing countries, regions, or periods by measures of
intergenerational mobility. Competing channels are at work, so that one cannot infer the
quality of policies from these measures. Finally, it may be more informative to analyze
the effects of policies on the components of earnings separately. For example by measuring
mobility in educational attainment rather than in earnings. The last two points have already
been taken up in related empirical research. Landersø and Heckman (2017) show that while
intergenerational mobility is larger in Denmark than in the United States when measured
by earnings, the same is not true when measuring mobility by educational attainment.
This paper includes two further sets of results. The first is on the role of college heterogeneity
and financial constraints. It turns out that even when students are essentially unconstrained
in their extensive margin of college choice (going or not), they may still be constrained
in their intensive margin of college choice (which college to go to). Thus, accounting for
college heterogeneity is crucial in understanding the welfare implications of higher education
policies.
Second, the model yields a decomposition of the current persistence of earnings across gener-
ations. Roughly half of earnings persistence is determined before the start of adult life. Thus,
while it is true that childhood is perhaps most important in determining intergenerational
mobility, higher education and adult life are worth studying. Of the remaining persistence,
about a third is due to money from parents, and two thirds to government policies. This
confirms previous results from similar quantitative theoretical work on the determinants of
college enrollment: parental resources are an important source of college financing, and may
be very responsive when education policies change. They thereby greatly reduce the impact
of education policies. Nevertheless, education policies have significant impact.
The remainder of this section discusses related literature (1.1.2). Section 1.2 uses theory
to demonstrate why higher education policies have a ambiguous effect on intergenerational
mobility. Section 1.3 contains a full description of the paper’s theory. Section 1.4 describes
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how the parameters of the resulting economic model are either estimated or set to match
moments. Section 1.5 explores the ability of the model to match aspects of the data that were
not targeted in the parameterization of the model. It also discusses what we can learn from
the theory’s positive implications. Section 1.6 contains results from counterfactual policies.
Section 2.7 concludes.
1.1.2 Literature
There is a macroeconomic literature that connects education policies to intergenerational mo-
bility. Lee and Seshadri (2014) argue that a rich life-cycle model with intergenerational links
explains a number of intergenerational relationships well, in particular the intergenerational
elasticity of earnings. They focus more on development of human capital during childhood,
and less on college heterogeneity. In particular, they do not allow for heterogeneous spending
on higher education.
Holter (2015) similarly builds a quantitative model of intergenerational mobility. He then
investigates the extent to which differences in tax and education policies can explain cross-
country differences in intergenerational mobility. Herrington (2015) also looks at the effect
of taxes and education policies on inequality and intergenerational mobility through the
lens of a model, comparing policies of the United States to those of Norway. Kotera and
Seshadri (2017) analyze the effect of public school spending at the compulsory stage on
regional variation in intergenerational mobility. The current paper features a richer model
of inter-generational links, and takes a more granular look at higher education policies. It is
also the first to discuss the theoretically ambiguous effect of these policies.
Positive implications of education policies on college enrollment are studied by a number of
authors. Important work is by Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b), who consider the effect
of student loan policies on the college entry decision of youth that is heterogeneous in ability
and family income. Abbott et al. (2013) study the decision to go to college or not in a quanti-
tative model with intergenerational transfers, and find that these transfers are an important
adjustment margin that dampen the effects of education policies in equilibrium. They only
consider one type of college. Empirical work on the incidence of financial constrainedness is
summarized in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a), who find increased evidence for such
incidence in recent years. None of these papers focus on intergenerational mobility.
There is a large normative literature on education policies, often in combination with taxa-
tion. While these papers answer a different question, their insights guide the discussions of
policy optimality in this work. Krueger and Ludwig (2016) focus is on optimal taxation with
(almost) linear instruments. Their paper also includes intergenerational transfers, but only
has one type of college, and considers general equilibrium effects as well as the importance of
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the transition between different policy regimes. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005, 2011) find that
while education subsidies themselves distribute resources to the well to do, their optimal
level may still be positively related to tax rates. This is because they undo the disincentive
effects of taxation on human capital formation. The same issue has been been studied in
a dynamic theoretical framework by Stantcheva (2017), and in a quantitative framework
by Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003). Further, in an incomplete market where students
cannot borrow against future income, there is a role for government-provided student loans.
These are studied in a dynamic framework by Findeisen and Sachs (2016a). Finally, Find-
eisen and Sachs (2016b) study an economy with the same motivation for education subsidies
as in Bovenberg and Jacobs, but with an extensive margin for college choice and under fi-
nancial constraints. In that case, the government wants to efficiently target those who would
optimally be students from a social standpoint, but who would not enter college in the ab-
sence of policy intervention. It can do so by need-dependent grants, essentially using parental
income as a tag of financial constraints. Insights from this normative literature guide some
of the discussion of policy in this paper.
Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug (2011) attempt to synthesize a growing literature on the effect
of parents’ schooling on children’s schooling. Overall, the causal effect of changes to parents’
schooling on children’s schooling appears to be small relative to the total correlation between
parents’ schooling and that of their children. That is in line with this paper’s assumptions,
since it takes ability at the start of adult life (and its transition across generations) as given.
At the same time, Holmlund et al. find that the causal effect of parental schooling may be a
sizable part of the ‘nurture’ component to the overall correlation. The mechanism by which
this occurs is unclear: it may be due to parents’ schooling leading to higher incomes, or due
to other factors. The former is modeled in this paper where it concerns tertiary education.
Incorporating the effects of policies on the development of children in the earlier stages of
the life cycle would likely increase the effects sizes reported in this paper. This is discussed
further in subsection 1.4.1.
1.2 Decomposing Intergenerational Mobility
The most commonly used measure of intergenerational persistence is the intergenerational
elasticity of earnings (IGE), measured as βIGE in the regression equation below:
log(y′) = β0 + βIGE log(y) +  (1.1)
Here, y is a measure of parental earnings, and y′ measures the earnings of their children. As
we will see later, measurements of βIGE in the literature have a wide range between 0.3 and
0.6, suggesting that a 1% increase in parental earnings is expected to lead to 0.3% to 0.6%
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higher earnings for children. In other words, earnings are persistent over generations but not
perfectly: they regress to the mean.
As is well known, common estimators of the equation above (such as OLS) are unbiased
estimators of
βIGE =
Cov(log y′, log y)
V ar(log y)
.
When an economy is in steady state, V ar(log y) =
√
V ar(log y)
√
V ar(log y′), so that the
IGE measures Cor(log y′, log y).
In a typical macroeconomic model of labor, wages would be represented by human capital
(h) times some idiosyncratic shock to income (x). The latter represents any form of luck not
related to ability or education. Using this as our measure of earnings (and abstracting from
labor supply for this exposition), we have:
log y = log h+ log x.
If we now (in addition to considering steady state economies) assume that luck is entirely
independent from human capital as well as from parental characteristics, we can write:
βIGE =
Cov(log h, log h′) + Cov(log x, log h′)
V ar(log h) + V ar(log x)
=
Cor(log h, log h′)V ar(log h) +
[
Cor(log x, log h′)
√
V ar(log h)√
V ar(log x)
]
V ar(log x)
V ar(log h) + V ar(log x)
(1.2)
Now, the IGE is a weighed mean of the correlation between two generations’ human capital
on the one hand, and a measure of the influence of parental luck on children’s human capital
on the other. The respective weights are the variance of log human capital, and the variance
of log income shocks.
The economic role of higher education policies is to relieve financial constraints. So how does
the IGE change when financial constraints are relieved? Table 1.1 makes a comparison using
the components of the expression above.
The first component is conventional: the correlation of human capital across generations.
Financial constraints in education deny the children of poor parents the education they need
to go to college, thereby keeping them poor. This increases the persistence of earnings across
generations, as poor parents are now more likely to produce poor children (compared to the
unconstrained case). This is indeed true, but applies to the intergenerational correlation of
human capital only (row 1 of Table 1.1).
The second component of our weighted sum goes the same way. Parental luck increases chil-
dren’s human capital when they are financially constrained, but less so in the unconstrained
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case: without constraints, children’s potential outcomes do not depend on the financial sit-
uation of their parents. Thus, the second term (row 2 of Table 1.1) also increases due to
financial constraints.
So how can the role of education policies be ambiguous? It turns out that the ‘weights’ given
to the two terms provide a sharp trade-off (rows 3 and 4 of Table 1.1). As I will argue later,
the variance of log income shock is unlikely to vary much due to education policies. However,
the variance of log human capital may. If the same education policies that release constraints
also increase the variance of human capital in the system, then that makes the correlation
in human capital more important (and luck less so). Because we would expect the human
capital of two generations to be more correlated than parental luck and children’s human
capital (the first term dominates the second), it is not clear which way the IGE will finally
move - that becomes a matter of measurement.
Table 1.1: The effect of financial constraints on the IGE
Unconstrained Constrained
Cor(log h, log h′) <[
Cor(log x, log h′)
√
V ar(log h)√
V ar(log x)
]
<
V ar(log x) =
V ar(log h) >
In fact, in the remainder of this paper I find that the variance effect (row 4 of Table 1.1)
dominates for the model’s equivalent of current US higher education policies. As a result,
education policies actually decrease intergenerational mobility. The paper also demonstrates
that the result does not depend on the measure of mobility I discuss here.
1.3 A Theory of Intergenerational Earnings Persistence
This paper’s theory of intergenerational persistence focuses on higher education. Below, the
first subsection sketches a stylized model of colleges in a competitive setting.2 As a result of
that model, students can choose how much to invest in their own education, with colleges
just translating spending into investment.
In the second subsection, the same model of colleges and college choice is embedded in a
model of the labor market. Higher education takes place in the first period at the start of
adulthood. Thereafter, agents go through a life cycle of earnings and related choices, and
2The terms ‘college’ and ‘institution of higher education’ are used interchangeably. Later, the model will
be brought to the data in such manner that the higher education phase represents the entire higher education
career.
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have children of their own. Together, these models then describe earnings persistence and
the role of higher education in it. Modeling choices are highlighted as they appear. The
individual’s decision problem is specified in full. The subsection ends with a definition of
stationary equilibrium and a description of the solution method.
1.3.1 A Model of Colleges
Students are defined by their learning ability α. When going to a college, that learning
ability combines with time spent studying e and money invested in education d to form
human capital h(α, d, e). To have money invested in education, the student must go to a
college, which charges price d˜(d, q, α) for an investment of d.3 In principle, the college can
condition that price on the student’s parental income status q (so that the price of college
becomes need based) and on the ability α of the student (which makes the price merit based).
The student’s decision making problem is discussed in detail in the following subsection. For
now, it suffices to say that the student chooses from available colleges based on the price he
must pay for d, since that is the only thing the college has to offer. Peer effects, whether
through learn or networking, as well as the signaling value of going to a college are not
modeled explicitly. The model will be parameterized to match the actual earnings returns
to investing in education, so that it does not matter for the purposes of this paper whether
these returns are due to actual learning or other sources.
Private colleges are indexed by their level of educational spending per student d, which is
the same for each student in the college. Colleges do not face any fixed cost. Instead, they
have access to an education technology in which they simply incur the cost of educational
investment for each student.4 New colleges can freely enter any market for a d type college,
free of cost. Suppose they either value profits (for-profit colleges) or their existence (not-for-
profit colleges). Then we have the following:
∀q∀α d˜(d, q, α) ≤ d.
Any type of student receives an educational investment that is at least as large as their
spending on college. If this condition were violated for any type of student, new colleges
would enter and offer the same services at a lower price until some college offers d˜(d, q, α) = d.
3Price here is meant to refer to the price for college, and not for food, lodging, and the like. Those are
considered consumption items for the purposes of this paper, and will be treated as such when connecting
theory and data.
4This is a simplification that does not come at much of a cost. Because costs now scale linearly in the
number of students, the number of students in each college will be indeterminate. This is not important for
the purposes of this paper.
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Can colleges exist for whom d˜(d, q, α) < d for some type of student? Yes, if they have
other income that they choose to invest in their students’ education. A clear example of
such income would be endowment income. In any case, due to the result above, any college
pricing schedules can always be written as follows:
d˜(d, q, α) = d− gI(q, α), where gI(q, α) ≥ 0.
This type of pricing schedule is precisely what we observe in data on college pricing. Colleges
typically post a sticker price, from which they offer discounts in the form of explicit insti-
tutional student grants. Because of this practice, we can separately observe the discounts in
data on institutional student grants. As a result, we do not need to make assumptions on
colleges’ objective functions for the purposes of this paper.
The result of all of the above is a model of ‘translated spending’. Students decide what to
spend on higher education, and through competitive colleges that same amount (plus any
grants received) is invested in their human capital. This way of thinking about goods in-
vestment in human capital is much in line with the macroeconomic literature. Some papers
in other literatures explicitly model the behavior of colleges. For example, Epple, Romano,
and Sieg (2006) analyze a model with quality maximizing colleges, peer-effects and a prefer-
ence for low-income student enrollment, where price discrimination leads to student sorting
over colleges. Epple, Romano, Sarpc¸a, and Sieg (2013) then adapt this framework to include
public universities and endow students with idiosyncratic preferences over colleges. For a
number of reasons, these frameworks are less applicable to questions this papers asks. All
these papers take colleges as given, both in numbers and in terms of characteristics, and can
therefore not explain why we see the colleges that we see. The strategic interactions these
models describe typically become less relevant when the number of colleges grows large - and
the number of colleges is large in reality. Idiosyncratic preferences by students over colleges
can maintain college pricing power even then, but it is not clear whether this is an empir-
ically relevant channel. Lastly, this work’s model makes a sharp prediction on the shape of
the pricing function, which other papers have to impose by assumption instead.5
Not being explicit about colleges’ objectives comes at a cost. How do colleges respond when
government education policies adjust? This work will maintain the assumption that they
simply do not. Objectives from which this would result are thinkable, although they would
be non-standard.
At last, students can in practice choose to enter public colleges. Public colleges in the United
States largely function like private ones, with the qualification that the government sets
5Recent work by Cai and Heathcote (2018) is an important exception. Cai and Heathcote also model a
competitive market for colleges, resulting in an endogenous distribution of colleges. Going beyond this paper,
they treat colleges as a ‘club good’ so that there is a strategic aspect to college choice in their model.
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pricing schedules and determines how much money a public college has to spend on education.
Availability of public colleges often depends on place of residence. To capture all this, I
model one representative public college with its own pricing schedule (also consisting of a
sticker price and institutional grants) that is set by the government, to which all students
have access. In practice, there is heterogeneity in public colleges, although offerings are set
by local governments. This likely makes availability less responsive to demand then private
college offerings (as well as dependent on geography). Modeling a single representative public
college also greatly reduces computational complexity.
1.3.2 A Model of the Labor Market
This paper considers stationary equilibria. There is a continuum of agents with mass one.
Each agent spawns a new agent with a mass identical to its own. We refer to the former as
parents and the later as children. The timing of the life-cycle is deterministic and equal for
all households. The symbol ′ is used to denote variables pertaining to an agent’s children.
Each agent goes through a life-cycle from age 0 to age T , representing his working life. There
are two special phases in this life cycle: In the first period of his life, the agent has access to
colleges and, if he chooses to enroll in a college, a system of student grants and loans. At a
later point in life (age tI) he makes an inter-vivos transfer to his children, who begin their
life-cycle in the following period. The agent does so because he values the child’s expected
discounted lifetime utility (at a rate potentially lesser than its own, so that these parents are
said to be imperfectly altruistic). This is in line with the literature on inter-vivos transfers,
which finds that transfers depend on need or effectiveness (Gale and Scholz, 1994). Modeling
the entire life-cycle is useful for at least two reasons: First, several measurements in the
empirical literature are taken at specific ages, so that having a model counterpart to these
ages is important. Second, the model is then able to capture the life cycle of earnings as in
the data, thereby ensuring that returns to education are adequately captured.
In each period, an agent can use his time to work, enjoy leisure, or to invest in human
capital. In any period, he can use his resources to consume, save, and repay student loans.
At age 0, he chooses whether to go to college or not, and if so how much to invest in a college
education. At age tI he can make an inter-vivos transfer. All resources are expressed in terms
of consumption, which is also the model’s numeraire. Markets in the model are incomplete
in the sense of a Bewley-Aiyagari-Huggett model: agents face idiosyncratic income risk that
they cannot insure against. They can borrow using (student) loans and save using a risk-
free asset, but face borrowing constraints that potentially constrain their consumption and
human capital investment. Individual gross earnings are a combination of human capital and
its price, hours worked, and the realization of idiosyncratic wage uncertainty.
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Compared to most models of college choice, human capital is continuous in this paper. This
allows the model to capture the full effect of education and policies, rather than just the
effect on those at the margin of college entry. In college, human capital growth is formed
by a constant elasticity production function in ability, goods and time investment. I later
show that this functional form captures returns to college well. Those who choose not to go
to college or are no longer in college accumulate human capital by a function that is of the
Ben-Porath (1967) type, taking only time as an input. This functional form has proven to
be successful at capturing the life-cycle of earnings, as well as its heterogeneity across the
earnings distribution.
Throughout, agents are assumed to be fully aware of their own ability, which is in line with
the finding in the literature that students’ uncertainty about their own learning ability is
small (cf. Hendricks and Leukhina, 2017). Only one period of fixed length (which will later be
set to four years in the data) is used to represent the entire higher education career. Human
capital accumulates at the end of that period. This is somewhat restrictive with regards to
the time taken to complete college. In reality, some students go to two year colleges, some
engage in graduate studies, and so forth. However, it deserves emphasis to say that these
different sizes of educational investment are not ruled out: during the period, students can
still spend different levels of money and time. The issue is treated with care when connecting
the model to data. A similar point holds with regards to drop-outs: these are not modeled
explicitly, but that does not undo the empirical strategy of this paper. All relevant data used
are conditioned on college entry only.
Each agent in the model economy is linked to their parents in three ways. First, agent’s
ability to accumulate human capital is correlated with that of their parents. Second, parents
endogenously decide how much financial resources to make available to their children as they
make initial decisions on human capital investment. Third, government education policies
are dependent on parental income. These mechanisms are important in assessing the impact
of education policies on human capital investment decisions: when policies change and make
more or less resources available, parental transfers are a major compensating margin. And
the more persistent ability is across generations, the more correlated wealth and ability will
be, reducing the influence of education policies.
The economy contains detailed features of the policy environment in the United States, in
particular: taxes, educational subsidies and grants, and student loans: average labor tax rates
are non-linear and based on the US tax code, as are other taxes. Section 1.8.2 provides a
detailed overview of student aid in the United States in 2003, the year to which the model
will be calibrated. The Stafford loan system is explicitly modeled in this paper. To capture
subsidies and grants from institutions and all levels of government, the model employs a
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flexible specification that allows estimation of these items directly from the data. Finally,
students can also choose to go to a representative public college.
Individual’s problem
Let st denote the stochastic state of the agent’s life-cycle at age t, and s
t a history of
stochastic states up to age t: st = [st, st−1, . . . , s1, s0]. These histories are suppressed in most
of the below, but made explicit where the arguments of the maximization problem are listed.
In the below, c denotes consumption, l leisure, e time investment in human capital, d goods
investment in human capital, a assets, b student loans, and v inter-vivos transfers. k denotes
college choice (work : k = 1; study at a private college: k = 2; study at a public college: k = 3).
For a generic variable x, I[x] is an indicator function that equals one when x is true and zero
otherwise. q denotes gross parental wages, which is described in further detail below. The
same goes for student loan repayment functions pi(b) and borrowing constraints. E is the
usual expectations operator. Denote a vector of control variables as follows:
zt = [ct, lt, et, at+1].
The initial problem now consists of a college choice, meaning an individual can choose to
go to college or not. If the individual does go to a private college, there is an additional
choice of the level of educational investment d (which is available at any positive level). If
the individual goes to a public college, educational investment dg is set by the government
(as is its price d˜g). The individual’s choice will depend on a fixed learning ability α, parental
wages q (to be discussed below), and their initial asset holdings a0. Formally:
V (α, q, a0) = max{work,study}
{
W0(α, h0(α0), 0, a0), max{public,private}
{
Cg(α, q, a0),max
d≥0
Cd(α, q, a0)
}}
College enrollment lasts for one period of the model, during which the problem of an indi-
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vidual who goes to college d looks as follows:
Cd(α, q, a0) = max
z0(s¯),b1
{
(cν0l
1−ν
0 )
1−σ
1− σ +W1(α, h1(d, e0, α), pi1(b1), b1)
}
subject to:
c0(1 + τc) ≤ (1− l0 − e0)wh0x(s¯)(1− τn(·))− d˜(d, q, α)
+ a0(1 + r(1− τa))− a1 − b1
c0 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l0, e0 ≤ 1, l0 + e0 ≤ 1,
a1 ≥ 0, 0 ≥ b1 ≥ −b0, a1b1 ≥ 0, s0 = s¯.
Leisure and consumption enter periodic utility multiplicatively. The utility function is tied
down by parameters σ and ν.6 Consumption and consumption taxes are paid for by what
remains of net labor earnings, assets, and student loans after paying for college. Labor
earnings are composed of hours worked (1 − l − e), wage rate w, human capital h, and
idiosyncratic shock x(s). The idiosyncratic shock x(s) is a function of stochastic state s.
The problem for those who enter the representative public college is the same, only that
their education now costs d˜g(d, q, α) and yields an investment of dg.
An individual who does not go to college or has finished studying enters the labor market.
The problem of working life is the following:
Wj(α, hj, pij, aj) =
max
{{z(st)}
st
}tI−1
t=j
,{{z(st)}
st
}T−1
t=tI+1
,{{
z(st
I
,α′)
}
st
}
α′
,
{{
v(st
I
,α′)
}
st
I
}
α′
E
{
T−1∑
t=j
βt
(cνt l
1−ν
t )
1−σ
1− σ + ωβ
tIV (α′, q′, v)
}
subject to ∀t ∈ {j, . . . , T − 1}:
ct(1 + τc) ≤ (1− lt − et)wht(dt−1, et−1, ht−1, α)x(st)(1− τn(·))
− vI[t=tI ] + at(1 + r(1− τa))− at+1 − pij
ct, v ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lt, et ≤ 1, lt + et ≤ 1, aT−1 ≥ 0, a1 ≥ 0,
q′ = whtIxtI , α
′ ∼ Γα(α, α′), s0 = s¯, st+1 ∼ Γs(st, st+1).
6With this functional form, the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is given by 11−ν(1−σ) , and the
Frisch elasticity by 1−ν(1−σ)σ
l
(1−l) .
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This is a typical life-cycle problem, where next-period utility is discounted by β. The pa-
rameter ω discounts the value function of the child’s adult life at tI , which starts at tI+1. At
tI , parents can make an inter-vivos transfer v that affects their child’s initial value function.
Consumption is paid for using net labor earnings and assets after student loan repayment pi.
Human capital So what does an individual gain from college or time spent learning?
Both increase human capital, but in different ways. Out of college, human capital production
similarly follows from a Ben-Porath (1967) function. This functional form, which has been
of much use in the macroeconomics literature, can match the life cycle of earnings well given
the right parameterization. Key is that the time input is measured in human capital hours,
which ensures that hours spent learning or earning are always in direct trade-off:
ht+1 = ht(1− δh) + α(etht)βW . (1.3)
In college, the post-depreciation gain in human capital (denoted ∆δh1 ≡ h1 − h0(1− δh)) is
assumed to have a constant elasticity in both goods and hours of human capital invested,
as well as in ability. Combined with the assumption that a zero investment of either goods
or time results in zero creation of human capital (hC(0, e0h0, α) = h
C(d, 0, α) = 0), this
immediately yields the following:
log(∆δh1) = log β
C
0 + β
C
1 logα + β
C
2 log(e0h0) + β
C
3 log d, (1.4)
or in levels:
h1 = h0(1− δh) + βC0 αβ
C
1 (e0h0)
βC2 (d)β
C
3 . (1.5)
Thus, the same ability that helps learning during working life also determines learning ability
in college. I assume that ability is more effective in college, meaning βC1 > 1. The log-
constant term in the above is important, because the role of ability has to nevertheless be
rescaled versus that in working life, where the distribution of α is parameterized. Initial
human capital, h0, is simply assumed to be a linear function of ability, which makes the two
perfectly correlated. This is further discussed in the section on parameterization. Because
zero goods spending in college results in an ineffective function, the model will endogenously
generate a minimum level of spending among college students.
Cost of college As follows from the model of colleges above, the monetary input d depends
on the choice variable d but is not the same: here is where we account for institutional aid
as well as student grants at the local, state, and federal level. That is why d also depends
on ability α and on q, the gross parental wage rate, which is determined by the previous
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generation: q′ = whtIxtI .7 The discussion of the calibration of the model elaborates these
points further.
Information structure The agent is uncertain about the next realization of his idiosyn-
cratic earnings state st ∈ S. All agents start out from the same state: s0 = s¯. In the next
period (when all individuals work) s1 is drawn from Γs1(q), where the parental gross wage
rate influences the probability of starting out in a good state. This allows the model to cap-
ture the importance of parental networks and influence. Thereafter st follows a first-order
discrete Markov process with transition matrix Γs(st, st+1). The earnings shock x(st) com-
bines with his human capital ht and the wage w of human capital to determine his individual
wage rate.
The agent is also generally uncertain about his child’s ability α′ ∈ A, but gets to know
the child’s ability right before he makes an inter-vivos transfer. (All choice variables at tI
therefore also depend on α′.) Ability is discrete and drawn from the joint distribution of
parents’ and children’s ability Γα(α, α
′).
Taxation A government charges taxes on consumption τc, labor income τn((1 − lt −
et)whtx(st)), and capital income τa. Labor income taxes are non-linear. The government’s
budget, after consideration of education policies, is balanced by neutral (or wasteful) spend-
ing G that does not influence any choices.
Student loans The student loan system mimics the 2003 Stafford loan system as follows.
At age 0, college-going students fall into one of two eligibility categories on the basis of
their parents’ wages at the time they become independent decision makers. If parental wages
(q) are not higher than y∗, the student qualifies for subsidized loans up to bs as well as
unsubsidized loans up to bu. If parental wages are above y∗, the student can only borrow at
the unsubsidized rate up to bs + bu. Interest rates rs and ru are set exogenously. Interest on
subsidized loans is forgiven during the period in which they are paid out. Otherwise, agents
cannot borrow at age 0. The model also imposes that those who take out student loans do not
save assets at the same time, which is captured by the complementarity constraint a1b1 ≥ 0.
This structure follows and simplifies Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2013). After
7In reality, policies are heterogeneous across colleges and states, but typically depend on a number of
indicators of families’ ability to pay for college. Here, the gross parental wage rate is used as a parsimonious
proxy. Transitory components would have the potential to make the problem non-convex because parents
could adjust their choices to make their children qualify for student aid (which is something policy makers
indeed attempt to rule out).
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the college-going period, the natural borrowing constraint applies: all loans must be repaid
by the end of working life.
After the college-going period, students pay down their debt by a constant amount pi every
period for m periods. Since pay-down is linear, we can provide an analytical solution for pit.
When 1 ≤ t < 1 +m and b1 < 0:8
pit =

− rs
1−(1+rs)−m b1 if q ≤ y∗ and − bs ≤ b1
rs
1−(1+rs)−m b
s − ru
1−(1+ru)−m (b1 + b
s)(1 + ru) if q ≤ y∗ and b1 < −bs
− ru
1−(1+ru)−m b1(1 + r
u) if y∗ < q and b1 < 0.
Otherwise, pit = 0. For those who do not enter college, b1 = 0. Finally, in the above b0 =
bs + bu.
Stationary Equilibrium
The production function takes the following functional form:
F (K,H) = KθH1−θ. (1.6)
Here, H denotes the aggregate effective supply of human capital hours. θ is the capital share
of total factor income.
Labor, capital, and goods markets are perfectly competitive. We model the economy as closed
to labor, and open to capital and goods. This reduces the number of general equilibrium
conditions that must be cleared numerically, and is arguably as realistic as assuming an
economy that is entirely closed to capital. Additionally, general equilibrium effects through
capital formation are by no means a focus of this paper.
Firms borrow capital from households, who receive an international real interest rate r. A
share δ of capital is lost to depreciation, which firms reinvest from production. This share
is exempt from capital taxation. The openness assumption yields an equilibrium condition
relating the capital-labor ratio to the exogenous interest rate, which, together with the income
share of labor ties down the marginal product of labor.
For simplicity, all student grants are assumed to be under the control and paid for by the
model’s government, including institutional aid. The government also issues and collects
student debt, pays for public college subsidies, and collects taxes on labor earnings, capi-
tal income, and consumption. The government also pays for government expenses, and is
8Note that b1 is a negative number, while b
s and bu are positive.
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assumed not to hold any government debt or assets other than those mentioned. The gov-
ernment’s budget constraint is shown in equation 2.15 below.
Let x∗τ (ιt) denote a decision rule given states ιt ∈ It for a generic choice variable xτ . Let It
denote a generic subset of the Borel sigma algebra of age-specific state-space It.
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium of the model economy is defined as:
wages w;
college pricing schedules d˜(d, q, α);
allocations K, H;
government spending G;
net exports NA, net foreign asset position NX;
decision rules, each ∀ιt ∈ It whenever they are defined for t, for consumption {ct(ιt)}T−1t=0 ,
leisure {lt(ιt)}T−1t=0 , assets {at+1(ιt)}T−1t=0 , goods d(ι0) and time {et(ιt)}T−1t=0 investment in hu-
man capital, college choice k(ι0), student loan borrowing b(ι0), and the inter-vivos transfer
v(ιtI );
age-specific measures λt(It), and the resulting overall measure λ(I) on I ∈ ×It;
such that given international interest rates r, tax functions τc, τn, τa, sets S and A, tran-
sition matrices Γs1(q), Γs(st, st+1), and Γα(αˆ, α), grant schedules g
I(q, α) ≥ 0, repayment
function pit(b1), as well as the parameters of the model, the following holds:
- the decision rules solve the households’ problem as described in subsection 1.3.2;
- college pricing schedules solve the colleges’ problem; as a result, college pricing schedule
take the following form:
d˜(d, q, α) = d− gI(q, α), (1.7)
- the firms make profit maximizing decisions; as a result, their profits are zero and prices
of the inputs to production equal their marginal products:
r = F1(K,H)− δa, (1.8)
w = F2(K,H); (1.9)
- λt(It) are age-dependent fixed points of the law of motion that is generated by the
following:
– the decision rules of the households,
– the laws of motion for assets and human capital,
– the transition matrices of productivity shocks Γs1(q) and Γs(st, st+1),
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– the distribution over the initial states at independence which is consistent with
Γα(αˆ, α), parental wealth, and the decisions made by parents on schooling and
inter-vivos transfers;
- the market for labor clears:
H =
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
(1− lt − et)xtht dλt; (1.10)
- the market for capital clears:
K =
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
at dλt −NA; (1.11)
- the balance of payments with respect to the rest of the world holds:
rNA = −NX; (1.12)
- the market for goods clears (aggregate investment in assets equals depreciation since
the equilibrium is stationary):
F (K,H) =
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ct dλt +G+ δaK +
∫
I0
I[k=2]d dλ0 +
∫
I0
I[k=3]d
g dλ0 +NX; (1.13)
- and the government balances its budget (where the term involving (d− d˜) captures all
grants for private colleges, and the term involving (dg − d˜g) captures public college
subsidies and grants):
G+
∫
It
−I[k>1]b1 dλ0 +
∫
I0
I[k=2](d− d˜) dλ0 +
∫
I0
I[k=3](d
g − d˜g) dλ0 (1.14)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
(ctτc + atrτa) dλt +
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
(ntw(ht)x(st)τn(·)) dλt +
m∑
t=1
∫
It
pit dλt.
Finally, I show that the capital market equilibrium condition is satisfied by Walras’ law.
- Aggregating individual budget constraints (aggregate investment in assets post-depreciation
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is zero since the equilibrium is stationary, inter-vivos transfers net out in aggregate):
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ct dλt +
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ctτc dλt (1.15)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ntw(ht)x(st) dλt −
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
(ntw(ht)x(st)τn(·)) dλt
−
∫
I0
I[k=2]d˜ dλ0 −
∫
I0
I[k=3]d˜
g dλ0
+
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
atr dλt −
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
atrτa dλt
+
∫
It
−I[k>1]b1 dλ0 −
m∑
t=1
∫
It
pit dλt.
- Adding up the government budget constraint and aggregate individual budget con-
straints:
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ct dλt +G+
∫
I0
I[k=2]d dλ0 +
∫
I0
I[k=3]d
g dλ0 (1.16)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ntw(ht)x(st) dλt +
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
atr dλt.
- Combining this with labor market clearing and profit maximization conditions:
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
ct dλt +G+
∫
I0
I[k=2]d dλ0 +
∫
I0
I[k=3]d
g dλ0 (1.17)
= F2(K,H)H + (F1(K,H)− δa)
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
at dλt.
- Since F (K,H) = F1(K,H)K + F2(K,H)H, combining the goods market equilibrium
condition with the above yields:
F1(K,H)K + F2(K,H)H (1.18)
= F2(K,H)H + (F1(K,H)− δa)
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
at dλt + δaK +NX.
- Combined with balance of payments this yields the capital market equilibrium condi-
tion (after rearranging and dividing by (F1(K,H)− δa)):
K =
T−1∑
t=0
∫
It
at dλt −NA. (1.19)
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Solution Method
Given the assumptions underlying the above definition of stationary equilibrium, prices have
analytical solutions. (The institutional grant component of college pricing schedules is ex-
ogenously given.) This leaves the individual’s problem to be solved.
The individual problem is a simple life-cycle problem that can be solved by backward induc-
tion. At the same time, generations are linked through imperfect altruism. This complicates
matters, but not by much: simple rewriting of the problem yields a single recursive equation,
which is a relatively standard problem in macroeconomics.
V (α, q, a0) = max{k(s0),d(s0)}
st
0 ,
{{z(st)}
st
}tI−1
t=j
,{{z(st)}
st
}T−1
t=tI+1
,{{
z(st
I
,α′)
}
st
}
α′
,
{
v(st
I
)
}
st
I
E
{
T−1∑
t=0
βt
(cνt l
1−ν
t )
1−σ
1− σ + ωβ
tIV (α′, q′, v)
}
Constraints and transitions are suppressed in the above for parsimony, but are unchanged
except that they now depend on k(s0). The problem can be solved by iterating on an initial
guess of V .
The recursive structure combined with individual life cycles increases computational de-
mands, but when solving the problem by iteration on an initial guess the additional burden
is reduced by the possibility of introducing Howard Improvement steps: one does not need to
redo maximization on every iteration, which saves time when the maximization problem is
‘large’, as is the case here. The full computational procedure is sketched in Appendix 1.8.1.
1.4 Parameterization
I now proceed to discuss the parameterization of the model. The parameterization targets
the year 2003 or the closest possible. There reasons for targeting 2003 is data availability:
college enrollment in the datasets by Chetty et al. and Hoxby (2016a), ability tests of children
in the NLSY dataset, as well as a number of other measurements used in the below all take
place close to that year.
The parameter space consists of three parts: Some parameters are estimated outside of the
model. These are described in subsection 1.4.1. Some parameters are set directly (either
because they have obvious counterparts in reality or because they are readily available in
existing literature), and some are set to match moments of the model to their counterparts
in the data. These two types of parameters are both described in subsection 1.4.2.
31
1.4.1 Estimation
A number of important drivers are estimated outside of the model using microeconomic data.
These are, in particular, the transmission of ability, the idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty,
and the dependency of grants on ability and permanent parental income.
Ability transmission The intergenerational transmission of ability is determined by Γα(αˆ, α).
To calibrate this part of the model, I do not choose a functional form. Instead, I directly em-
ploy data from the NLSY79 (National Longitudinal Study of Youth ’79) and the Children of
the NLSY79 datasets, which contain scores on tests taken by mothers and their children. As
part of the former study, women aged about 16 to 23 were asked to take an AFQT (Armed
Forces Qualification Test) in 1981. They have been tracked since, and their children were also
tested using a variety of metrics. This allows to establish a connection between the ability
of mothers and their children. The test I use to assess the ability of children is the PIAT
Math test, who were between 14 and 16 years old (for the sample we select) when taking
the test. I then sort both mothers and children into quintiles on their respective scores, and
determine a transition matrix. Figure 1.3 displays the results graphically. Test scores are
persistent yet mean-reverting, with a stronger persistence in the tails than in the middle.
The overall correlation between mothers and their children’s test scores is 0.38.
Because the AFQT score is constructed to generate percentiles, I assume a linear trans-
formation of a discretized standard normal distribution of ability. Specifically, each state is
assigned the expected value of an observation in the corresponding quintile of a standard
normal distribution. Denoting the discretized standard normal distribution by α˜, and its
lowest entry by α˜, the distribution of α is formed as follows:
α = α˜γ + ρ. (1.20)
We still need to set the parameters ρ and γ. This is described further below.
Ex ante, there are two issues with the approach. First, these test scores may not actually be
a good measure of ability transmission. As we will see, the model (as a positive prediction)
produces realitic values of intergenerational persistence by a number of measures. This is
perhaps the argument that provides most comfort. In addition, these test scores are com-
monly used in the literature as measures of ability. In fact, our procedure essentially follows
Abbott et al. (2013). It is also worth calling to memory that the procedure is only used to
tie down the transition of ability, but not it’s distribution - which follows from a common
functional form assumption.
Second, since ability at the start of adult life is taken as given, one may argue that the Lucas
critique applies: policy changes in the model may lead to changes in the behavior of parents
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and children at earlier ages. This, in turn, would potentially alter the ability distribution at
the start of adult life that we take as given. In that sense, what is called ability here should be
interpreted very strictly: it is the transition and distribution of ability as currently measured,
i.e. ability at age 18. In practice, policy changes that make learning ability more worthwhile
give parents incentives to invest into their children’s earlier education. These reactions would
likely strengthen the behavioral mechanisms considered in this paper: lifting constraints on
educational investment in adult life will make earlier investments more valuable as well
(assuming different stages of education are complements). From that perspective, the effect
sizes reported in this paper will be conservative.
Figure 1.3: Ability transition
Grid lines show quantile bounds for each of the tests. The density of observations in each rectangle of the
grid illuminates persistence in test scores across generations.
Earnings uncertainty For most of the life cycle, the model setup of this paper restricts
idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty to be of a first-order Markov form, so that only one state
is requires to track the idiosyncratic component of earnings. This process is ideally calibrated
based on an empirical study of hourly wages that allows for significant heterogeneity in the
systemic component of wage profiles. As Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) note, the
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closest such study is by Haider (2001). Two complications now arise: that paper uses an
ARMA model for log wages, which would take an additional state variable to track the mov-
ing average of wages, and its estimates are based on yearly data while the calibration period
in this paper is four years. These issues are resolved as follows: the ARMA process estimated
by Haider (2001) is simulated, after which every four simulated periods are summed to one,
and an AR(1) process is estimated on the resulting series using maximum likelihood. Taking
this approach, we use both the best possible measurement of the idiosyncratic component of
wages, and the best possible approximation of that process in the context of our model. The
estimates of the autoregressive coefficient and error term variance are then used to create
a discrete and symmetric first-order Markov process with two states, which has the same
persistence and unconditional variance as the estimated AR(1) model. The final Γs(st, st+1)
and x(st) are shown in Table 1.2. The initial state of s in the model is fixed and denoted s¯,
and is set to the lower of the two states.
Table 1.2: Idiosyncratic earnings process
To
1 2
From 1 0.72 0.28
2 0.28 0.72
Value 0.72 1.28
The careful approach above is chosen because these shocks are an important element of
this paper. The yearly persistence implied by the the four-year probability of remaining in
the same state is 0.92. This is in line with other findings in the literature. For example,
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) report a yearly autocorrelation of 0.95.
Student grants and college subsidies Appendix 1.8.2 provides an overview of the land-
scape of US education policy around 2003. In part, student aid consisted of student loans and
subsidies to public colleges, which are modeled explicitly in this paper and parameterized
further below. For the remained, a plethora of student grants (from federal, state, and local
governments, as well as tuition discounts based on family income and merit) create a wedge
between individual costs for college (d˜) and actual investment in human capital (d). I now
lay out the mapping between these two variables, and then parameterize it by estimation
from data.
First, let us call the sticker prices observed in the data (a college’s headline figure for tuition
and fees) sD (where the superscript D will refer to data). Next, let us relate total aid gD
(from colleges and all levels of government) to sticker prices to capture general subsidies, and
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also to family income and human capital. These latter two capture need- and merit-based
aid. I consider a linear relationship as follows:
gD = β0 + β1q
D + β2s
D + β3α
D. (1.21)
Given data on grants, we can estimate the parameters in this equation.
Because sticker prices are paid either through private expenditures or from aid (which we
have defined broadly), we have sD = gD + d˜D. In addition, competitive pricing schedules
guarantee that dD = gD + d˜D, so that sD = dD. Concluding all of this, investment in college
is determined as follows:
dD(d˜D, qD, αD) =
1
(1− β2) [β0 + β1q
D + d˜D + β3α
D]. (1.22)
We still need to connect the data variables to those in the model. Here, there are two issues at
play. First, the numeraire in the model is different from the numeraire in the data. Second,
the unit of measurement for human capital will be different. I resolve this by rewriting
equation 1.22 as follows:
dD
y¯D
=
β0
(1− β2)y¯D+
β1
(1− β2)
qD
y¯D
+
1
(1− β2)
d˜D
y¯D
+
β3
(1− β2)y¯D α¯
D+
β3σ
D
α
(1− β2)y¯D
αD − α¯D
σDα
. (1.23)
Here, y¯D are average earnings as measured in the data. α¯D and σDα are also assumed measur-
able in the data, and represent the mean and standard deviation of αD. Now, note that this is
an equation relating normalized instructional expenditure d
D
y¯D
to normalized parental income
qD
y¯D
, normalized personal education expenditure d˜
D
y¯D
, and normalized ability α˜D = α
D−α¯D
σDα
. All
of these terms have clear model counterparts, while the coefficients are measurable in the
data.9
Rewriting for the model counterpart of equation 1.23, we get (with the superscript M refer-
ring to model variables):
dM = a0 + a1q
M + a2d˜
M + a3α˜
M . (1.24)
Here, a0 =
β0
(1−β2)
y¯M
y¯D
+ β3
(1−β2)
y¯M
y¯D
α¯D, a1 =
β1n¯
(1−β2) , a2 =
1
(1−β2) , and a3 =
β3σDα
(1−β2)
y¯M
y¯D
. All inputs
underlying these terms can be estimated from data.
Next, we turn to measurement. The National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS)
by the NCES for the year 1995-1996 links surveys of student finances to characteristics of
the colleges they are enrolled in. In this dataset we find total aid received from all sources
9The counterpart to qD, gross parental income, is qM , a gross wage rate. Thus, we use qM n¯ as the
relevant counterpart to turn the model wage rate into model earnings. We set n¯ to 0.35, based on a daily
time endowment of 16 hours (for each of 7 days) and a reported weekly 39.53 hours of total market work in
2003 Aguiar and Hurst (2007).
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(except Stafford and PLUS loans), tuition and fees (before any aid), gross parental income,
as well as SAT scores (combined scores) which function as a proxy for human capital. I use
these data to estimate equation 1.21 by Ordinary Least Squares, restricting the sample to 4-
year colleges. The regression is done separately for private and public colleges. Observations
containing zeros are excluded, except for grants. The regression is weighted by the NCES’s
full sample weights.
Table 2.3 contains the estimates, as well as a measure of the explanatory power of the linear
model and the number of observations used. Finally, the resulting parameters of equation
1.24, which are directly fed into the model, are displayed as well. From the NPSAS we have
that σDα = 226.1 and α¯
D = 930.0 when assuming a normal distribution on the SAT score
data (calculated from percentile data), which is also the assumption in the model. y¯D is
$31,141 in 1995 USD according to the OECD.
Table 1.3: Regression results (standard errors in brackets)
(1.21) (1.24)
gD dM
Public Private Public Private
Constant 1127.10 376.88 Constant: a0/y
M 0.05 0.11
(331.59) (815.61)
qD -0.01 -0.02 qM : a1 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
sD 0.15 0.24 d˜M : a2 1.18 1.32
(0.02) (0.04)
αD 0.19 2.39 α˜M : a3/y
M 0.00 0.02
(0.38) (0.72)
R2 0.09 0.12
Observations ∼5,600 ∼4,800
The regression results show that grants for private colleges depend more on merit and need
compared to those for public ones, but that the latter have a larger constant component. This
conclusion regarding the intercept changes slightly when translating the regression results to
model parameters in the right half of the table. Because sticker prices are higher in private
colleges, grants tend to be higher as well even when disregarding merit and need. In both
types of colleges, not spending anything results in a positive grant when parental income is
zero. Also, spending more results in more investment (since that is a one-to-one relationship)
but also in more need and thus more grants, making the coefficient of spending larger than
one. Negative grants could technically occur in this linear relationship for some combinations
of inputs, but do not actually occur in the calibrated model.
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1.4.2 Moment Matching
The below describes the moments used, together with the parameters that they are infor-
mative of. This subsection ends with an overview.
Life-cycle The model period is set to four years. Model ages are set as close as possible to
their counterparts in reality: working life starts at age 18 (t = 0), retirement at 66 (T = 12).
Child birth occurs at age 28, which is the average age of mothers at child birth10, so that
children start their working life when the parent is aged 46. Inter-vivos transfers are made
during the period before that (tI = 6).
Production We use values for discounting (β, yearly value 0.987) and depreciation (δa,
yearly value 0.012) that are standard in the literature. We adjust these values for our model
period. The international interest rate (r) is set such that the post-depreciation yearly rate
r is 1%. This results in an interest rate slightly below that of an equivalent closed complete
markets economy ( 1
β
− 1). θ is set equal to the capital share of total factor income in the
data (0.33).11
Preferences ν and σ are set to match average hours worked and the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution. The former is taken to be 35%, based on a daily time endowment
of 16 hours and a reported weekly 39.53 hours of total market work in 2003 Aguiar and
Hurst (2007). For the latter we rely on a meta-study by Havra´nek (2015), who finds that the
literature’s best estimate for this elasticity is 0.3-0.4 after correcting for publication bias. I
use the midpoint of that range.
Inter-vivos transfers Abbott et al. (2013) do extensive empirical work on inter-vivos
transfers using survey data from the NLSY97.12 They estimate average total inter-vivos
transfers between age 16 and 22 to be $30,566 in 2000 dollars (79% of the 2000 average
wage, or 20% of 4 years of average wage when accounting for the model period), and we set
ω to match this figure with our one-off inter-vivos transfer.
10Calculated from 2010 data provided by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
11Data are available from the OECD for 2003.
12The NLSY97 surveys a nationally representative sample of individuals in much the same manner as the
NLSY79, starting in 1997. Participants were aged 12 to 16 when they first participated.
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Human capital The initial distribution of human capital (h0) is assumed to be a linear
transformation of the distribution of ability, and thereby perfectly correlated with ability.
Here, the paper essentially takes the view that it is ability to learn that is, together with
actual knowledge, built earlier in life. Once the child matures, the two are then separate
entities: underinvestment can lead to a level of knowledge that is low versus learning ability,
and vice versa. If we were to let go of the link at an earlier age, catch-up effects might occur
where an undertrained but able child, given the same educational, outperforms peers who are
more knowledgeable to begin with. While this may certainly occur in practice, we choose to
ignore the effect here: First, the empirical literature points in another direction, suggesting
that there are strong complementaries between early and later education. Indeed it seems
that the purpose of training in early childhood is in large part ’learning to learn’ what is
taught in tertiary education and at work. Second, related papers that separate ability and
initial human capital early in life, such as Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011), find the two
to be strongly correlated. Other papers have therefore proceeded in the same way as I do,
notably Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014).
Quantities of human capital are yet to be normalized, which is done as follows:
h0 = hnorm + (α˜− α˜)ψ. (1.25)
Thus, the lowest level of initial human capital in the economy is normalized to hnorm. The
resulting normal distribution (approximate due to discretization) has mean (hnorm − α˜ψ)
and standard deviation ψ. These results are used to implement equation 1.24.
Summing up, the parameters γ, ρ (from equation 1.20) regulate the distribution of ability, the
parameter ψ (from equation 1.25) regulates the distribution of initial human capital (while
hnorm can be set to any computationally convenient value), and β
w and δh (from equation
1.3) regulate the build-up of human capital while at work. I set all of these parameters to
capture features of the distribution of age-earnings profiles.
Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) do empirical work to establish the distribution of pat-
terns of life-cycle earnings, taking into account time fixed effects. These data are displayed
in Figure 1.10 (in a later section of the paper). The sample consists of men who are attached
to the labor force. They show: (i) that earnings increase and then decrease over the life cycle,
(ii) how large this movement is versus what is given at the beginning of the cycle, (iii) that
inequality grows with age, and (iv) how much inequality there is in the system overall. The
model equivalents of these patterns are driven by the distributional parameters above. I take
the following moments from the data that capture these patterns:
1. Average earnings at age 32 over average earnings at age 24. (1.37)
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2. Average earnings at age 48 over average earnings at age 24. (1.57)
3. Average earnings at age 60 over average earnings at age 24. (1.32)
4. The variance of log earnings at age 32. (0.34)
5. The variance of log earnings at age 48. (0.42)
College effectiveness The effectiveness of college, together with the life-cycle of earnings,
is informative of the extent to which human capital is determined before college. The constant
elasticity functional form in equation 1.5 leaves the following parameters to be determined:
βC0 , β
C
1 , β
C
2 , and β
C
3 .
Key to some of the questions this work is after is the relative importance of financial resources
in the college production function of human capital. Hoxby (2016a) identifies the effective-
ness of money across the distribution of colleges in a setting where financial investment is
approximately exogenous, meaning that ability is controlled for. I target these results, which
are described further below.
βC0 determines how effective ability is in college versus at work, so that the share of the
population that decides to go to college is informative. Using data from Chetty et al. (2017)
which is on the relevant cohorts, I find that 75% of individuals in the relevant cohort enroll
in some sort of college. This is the relevant empirical counterpart for the model.
It is generally worth noting at this point that the paper takes a broad view of human capital:
human capital is continuous, and I do not explicitly deal with dropouts, 2-year colleges,
professional degrees, etcetera.
Combining all this, average inputs of time and money then imply the remaining parameters:
1. Data on time use by students are hard to come by, and do not generally paint a consis-
tent picture. Perhaps most important here is to capture the ability of students finance
their education by work time. I use the 2003 American Time Use Survey, and restrict
the sample to those enrolled in college and spending at least some time attending
class. I then calculate how much time these students spend on education (including
education-related travel) versus work (including work-related travel), aggregating indi-
viduals using ‘ATUS final weights’. The ratio of the former category versus the latter is
2.02: active students spend about twice as much time studying as they spend working.
I then halve this ratio twice: once to account for time during which colleges are out
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of session13, and once to account for time actually spent in college during the 4-year
period14.
2. To tie down spending on education, the calibration targets the share of GDP spent
on tertiary education from private sources. Because private spending in our model is
very narrowly defined as direct spending by households, we take the NIPA account on
private spending on higher education for 2003 as the counterpart in the data, which is
0.86% of the 2003 average wage.
Hoxby (2015, 2016a, 2016b) measures causal returns of a marginal dollar investment upon
college entry from discounted lifetime income. Her method is as follows: combining admin-
istrative data on incomes, clearinghouse data on college applications, and data on college
expenditures, she compares students who are ‘on the bubble’ of getting admitted to a college.
Student SAT scores help to identify students who are close to being admitted or rejected.
The assumption that identifies causal effects is the following: For students whose credentials
are close to the typical cut-off, admission can be thought of as a random event. Paired com-
parison methods then establish the extra monetary investment caused by admission, and the
subsequent returns to that investment. In doing so, the least selective college is normalized
to add zero value. Results show a marginal dollar return of around 3.5 after discounting for
colleges that are at least somewhat selective, and these returns increase slightly in college
selectivity. The results are relevant to college entry, so that college dropouts, 2-year or 4-year
colleges, and all other such issues, are averaged out.
Hoxby’s results have a model equivalent: I simulate the effect of an exogenous extra dollar
investment in college on discounted lifetime income (using the same discounting method as
Hoxby). The average of the resulting returns is a model moment that can be set to match
the typical return reported in Hoxby (2016b).
Public college Two choices are required regarding the representative public college. What
is the cost of attending before any grants (the sticker price), and by how much does the
government directly subsidize the college? According to Johnson (2014), the subsidy rate
for an average public college is about 53%, which leaves some $5,640 a year (or 10.48% of
average earnings) of an average $12,000 in spending per student per year to be paid for by
students and grants (data for 2011-2012). Therefore, $5,640 a year is the average sticker
price.
13The assumption here is that time worked stays constant over the year, and time spent studying goes to
zero during half the year. The exercise remains approximate due to the lack of appropriate aggregate data.
14This is to correct for drop-outs from college, 2-year-colleges, etcetera. Again, the exercise remains ap-
proximate due to the lack of appropriate aggregate data.
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Student loans I follow the structure of Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2013)
to model the student loan system around 2003, but with some simplifications. The main
simplification is that I do not model private student loans. As detailed in Appendix 1.8.2 and
in Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2013), these were a small source of financing, and
mostly available to students whose parents were sufficiently credit-worthy. Indeed, including
them would only strengthen the conclusions of this paper (but it would also come at added
computational cost).
The parameters y∗, bs, bu, rs, and ru are informed by the following moments:
1. Stafford aid was 0.33% of GDP or 0.31% of the average wage (College Board, 2013).
2. Subsidized Stafford aid was 54.54% of total Stafford aid (College Board, 2013).
3. The subsidized loan limit over the unsubsidized loan limit, which was 0.95.15
4. Interest rates for either type of student loan was around 4% (or 17% on a 4-year basis)
in 2003. 16
The repayment period length m is set to 20 years. While the initial repayment period has
typically been 10 years, this is easily extended in practice.
The above moments with regards to the Stafford loan system are chosen to accurately rep-
resent the generosity of the program overall, as well as to specific family income groups.
Cumulative loan limits for the two types of Stafford loans exist, and we use these to tie down
the relative generosity of the two programs in terms of available funds. However, whether
students can borrow up to these limits depends on a number of other factors (for example
their class level, dependency status, cost of attendance, and financial need), so that we in-
stead focus on matching overall amounts of borrowing. Costs of student loans (interest rates)
are taken from the data, ensuring an accurate representation of that aspect.
Tax policies Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) collect data on US earnings taxes at
different income levels for the year 2003 from the OECD. Using these data, I directly estimate
the two parameters of the much-used tax function described in Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2017). All of that results in the function below, where y¯ are the average United
15According to FinAid (2016), the aggregate subsidized loan limit in 2003 was $17,125, which was 43.16%
of GDP per capita at the time, while the aggregate unsubsidized loan limit in 2003 was $18,000, which was
45.37% of GDP per capita at the time.
16According to FinAid (2018), interest rates for Subsidized and Unsubsidized Stafford loans were the same
in the early 2000s, the rate being 4.06% in 2002-2003 and 3.42% in 2003-2004.
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States earnings (and the same parameter that is used in the implementation of equation
1.24).17
τn(·, y¯) = 1− 1
1.3434
(
ntwhxt
y¯
)−0.11867
.
I take the consumption and capital income tax rates from McDaniel (2007): τc = 0.075, and
τa = 0.232 for 2003. Government expenditures G are calibrated to clear the government
budget.
Overview Table 1.4 provides an overview of parameters set outside of the model and their
values. Table 2.4 lists parameters that were set to match moments: it displays the final
parameter values, together with the moments as measured in the model and in the data.
Percentages refer to either average wage or average wage per capita.
Table 1.4: Parameters set outside of the model
Value Moment
β 0.949 Discount rate
δa 0.047 Asset depreciation rate
r 0.088 Pre-depreciation real interest rate
θ 0.314 Capital share of income
rs 0.170 Subsidized Stafford loan rate
ru 0.170 Unsubsidized Stafford loan rate
Few of the parameters in Table 2.4 have a natural interpretation. The value for ω suggests
that parents count their children’s value function for a fifth of their own at the age where
the children mature. Depreciation of human capital is 12% during a four-year period. The
elasticity of human capital growth in college is largest in ability, followed by money and time
invested.
17I simply apply this formula to periodic model incomes, normalized by average wage. This would be
equivalent if incomes were indeed constant during the model period. For the purposes of this paper, we
consider it a good enough approximation.
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Table 1.5: Parameters set to match moments
Parameter Value Moment Model Data
σ 3.32 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.35 0.35
ν 0.80 Average labor supply 0.41 0.39
ω 0.20 Average inter-vivos transfer 18% 20%
γ 0.90 Variance of log earnings: age 32 0.34 0.34
ρ 1.90 Average earnings: age 48 vs. age 24 1.58 1.57
βW 0.10 Average earnings: age 32 vs. age 24 1.39 1.37
δh 0.12 Average earnings: age 60 vs. age 24 1.45 1.32
ψ 0.40 Variance of log earnings: age 48 0.48 0.42
βC0 0.70 Share with some college 76.11% 74.65%
βC1 1.58 Share of average wage spent on tuition 0.86% 0.83%
βC2 0.11 Time spent on education versus work 0.46 0.51
βC3 0.66 Average causal dollar return 3.18 3.50
d˜g(dg, 0, 0) 0.73 Average sticker price tuition 10.48% 10.48%
dg 1.26 Average subsidization rate 0.53% 0.53%
y∗ 25.00 Subsidized versus Unsubsidized Stafford aid 50.16% 54.54%
bs 0.27 Subsidized versus unsubsidized loan limit 0.95 0.95
bu 0.28 Overall Stafford aid 0.36% 0.31%
1.5 Implications
This section considers positive implications of the model that have not been targeted in
parameterizing the model.
1.5.1 Intergenerational Mobility
No measure of intergenerational persistence of economic outcomes has been targeted in the
model’s parameterization. This subsection compares model predictions against actual mea-
surements of persistence. The success of the model, summarized below, provides confidence
in the ability transition matrix, that was based on test scores.
Table 1.6 contains several measures of intergenerational persistence, first for the model and
then for the data. A range of estimates of the IGE exists in the literature. In their reviews of
the literature, Lee and Seshadri (2014) and Landersø and Heckman (2017) respectively arrive
at ranges of 0.4–0.6 and 0.3–0.5. The range of estimates is large due to differences in sample
selection and treatment: one can restrict the ages at which earnings are measured, the labor
attachment of individuals, their gender, etcetera. I report the model IGE using the entire
population, and then again controlling for age. Rank correlation measures are typically a bit
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Table 1.6: Measures of Intergenerational Mobility
Model Data
Intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) 0.34 0.3–0.6
IGE with controls for age 0.31
Intergenerational rank correlation of earnings 0.30 0.34
Correlation in educational attainment 0.21 0.11–0.45
lower. One such measure, by Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014) comes out at 0.34, in
line with our model (again using the entire model population). Finally, the intergenerational
correlation of educational attainment can also be measured. For the model, we do so simply
using indicators of college entry. As expected, the outcome is a bit below the other measures
and well within the range reported in the literature (see Mulligan (1999, Table 1)).
1.5.2 Heterogeneity of Intergenerational Mobility
Figure 1.4 reports the model equivalents to the measures used in Chetty et al. (2017),
which were displayed in Figure 1.2. Instead of grouping students by the college they go to,
I form quintiles of students by college spending (since spending is what identifies a college
in the model).18 I then measure average ability by college quintile (where individual abilities
have been normalized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one.). The patterns
we see are qualitatively and quantitatively in line with their empirical counterparts. The
share of low income students (defined as a family income in the bottom 20%) amongst
those that go to college (‘access’) falls as the average ability of students in a spending
quintile. At the same time, the likelihood that a student from a low income family reaches
the top 20% of the income distribution (‘success’) rises in the average ability of students.
The product of the two, the share of college students that go from the bottom to the top of
the distribution (‘mobility’), is flat across ability. The same patterns hold for the spending
quintiles themselves, where spending has been normalized by the average labor earnings in
a model period.
Chetty et al. (2017) also discusses how the intergenerational earnings elasticity changes when
one controls for the college a student enters. In doing so, they reduce the sample to those
who enter any college. Intuitively, if college choice is a perfect measure of human capital, and
human capital is all there is to earnings, one would expect the IGE to be reduced to zero.
If financial constraints make able students enter worse colleges, then in a given college the
children of the poor might even out-earn the children of the rich, making the IGE negative.
Chetty et al. report a national IGE (based on rank-rank regressions) of 0.29, which is reduced
18There are few distinguishable quintiles due to bunching in the public college.
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Figure 1.4: Access, Success, and Mobility in the Model
by two-thirds to 0.1 when including college fixed effects. (See Figure 1.1 and the discussion
there.) Should this result be taken to indicate that human capital cannot explain all of the
earnings persistence? The model suggests another explanation.
Figure 1.5 illustrates a similar procedure, but on model-generated data. College choices in
the model are very granular. So instead of using college fixed effects, educational investment
is included as a control. Again, one would expect to find a flat or even declining line, since in
the model all persistence is due to human capital. Interestingly, the coefficient also remains
positive in the case with controls, just as in the data.
Key to understanding this is the following: college spending and ability are not perfectly
assortative, even in the absence of constraints. While college spending is more effective for
the more able, their optimal level of investment is nevertheless not necessarily higher. This
is because time and money can be transformed through wages in the model, so that optimal
investment level also depend on demands for leisure time. Substitution effects dominate
income effects in the model overall, so that the more able earn and work more later in life.
At the same time, it is optimal for them to enjoy more leisure relatively early in life, as their
expected wages grow steeply. These increased demands for leisure in college can undo the
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higher effectiveness of spending. In short, smarter students sometimes study less and enjoy
more leisure, even when they can afford to go to a more expensive college. As a result of the
imperfect assortativeness between ability and investment, controlling for colleges does not
actually control for human capital. The initial premise, that one should expect the slope to
be zero when human capital alone explains persistence, is false: it can be positive, even when
constraints are present.
Figure 1.5: IGEs with and without controls
Graphs are created by fitting a straight line with slope equal to the IGE estimate through the point (50,50).
Landersø and Heckman (2017) estimate the IGE non-linearly, and find that persistence
is larger for those with higher income parents. A simple quadratic regression on model-
generated log earnings indeed produces a convex relationship between the earnings of two
generations: earnings persistence is stronger when parents have high earnings. Such findings
are entirely in line with one of the main messages of this paper: at the top of the earnings
distribution, human capital is more important than other components of earnings. At the
same time, human capital itself is quite persistent. Thus, we quite naturally find higher
persistence at the top of the distribution.
1.5.3 College Entry and Heterogeneity
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) shows the gradient of college enrollment by measured
ability and family income empirically, based on NLSY97 data for the early 2000s. Enrollment
rises strongly in ability, but also in family income. Figure 1.6 displays the model equivalent.19
Because ability is perfectly observable, the gradient in ability is much stronger than in the
data. As a result, the gradient in family earnings is not visible by overall enrollment. However,
as the results on public college enrollment and spending below will indicate, constrainedness
19It is worth noting that family earnings here are not equivalent to q from before, due to labor supply and
a difference in timing of measurement.
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(which I directly observe in the model) does depend on family income.20
Figure 1.6: College Entry by Ability and Family Income
Figure 1.7: Average Investment in Education by Ability and Family Income
20The model generates a surprising enrollment pattern for those in the second ability quintile. Members of
this quintile that do not enroll into college are exclusively agents who have not received any transfers from
their parents. At the same time, their access to grants reflects their parents’ income position, leading to a
negative gradient in family income.
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Figure 1.6 also splits entry between public and private colleges. In the data (e.g. the cohorts
analyzed in Chetty et al. (2017)) almost 80% of students go to ‘public’ colleges, although
this category does also include 2-year private not-for-profit institutions. As we would expect,
children of lower income families tend to go to the public colleges. A similar pattern is
visible in Figure 1.7, which shows goods invested in education by the same split. Investment
is expressed in terms of 2003 average wages, which is $168, 780 for the four year period.
Investment is split in private spending (including spending financed by loans) and aid, which
consists of both grants and subsidies in the case of public colleges. Spending heterogeneity is
mostly driven by family resources, and less so by ability. Aid is remarkably stable over both
gradients. This is due to three factors. First, there is only one representative public college,
so that subsidies are the same for all that go there. Second, grants for private colleges are
much larger, bringing aid for the students that go there into the same range. Third, for both
types of colleges, aid schedules are dominated by the intercept, meaning they are roughly
the same for all their students.
It is fairly obvious that a pattern of increasing college entry in ability could be achieved by
introducing ‘preference shocks’ that depend on parental background, as is typical in some
parts of the literature. I do not pursue this for three reasons: First, it makes the model
less parsimonious. Second, it is not obvious to what extent constraints, measurement error
(since SAT scores and the like are an imperfect measure of ability), and preferences are each
responsible for the pattern observed in the data. Third and most importantly, the results
presented here bear out one of the key results of the paper: even when there are no constraints
to overall college enrollment (the choice to go to college or not, which I call the extensive
margin of college choice), students may still be significantly constrained in their choice of a
particular college (which I call the intensive margin of college choice). After all, investment
in education still depends on family earnings.
For completeness, Figure 1.8 displays the distribution of private colleges by their total edu-
cational investment. The investment level of the representative public college is highlighted
as well (normalized by the average labor earnings in a model period). Private colleges invest
more in students than public ones. Their distribution is increasing at lower levels of spending,
which is in part due to students at the lower end that crowd into the public college.
Finally, returns to education are also heterogeneous by college. The approximate average of
the marginal per-dollar returns reported in Hoxby (2016b) was a target in the parameteriza-
tion of the model. That paper also shows some heterogeneity of returns to college, with the
per-dollar return growing in the average SAT scores of incoming students. The same pattern
is present in model-generated data: marginal per-dollar returns grow in students’ ability.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of Colleges
1.5.4 Paying for College
Within the model, constrainedness can be measured directly. Even in the highest family
earnings quartile, a significant share of students is constrained in their choices. Of course,
the regression methodology of this paper discards much heterogeneity in grants that may be
relevant in practice. The overall impact of this on constrainedness is unclear. In any case, the
patterns generated by the model points to an interesting nuance. Constraints seem to keep
few from enrolling in at least some college. (This is in some part due to the presence of the
public option.) At the same time, almost all spend less on college than would be optimal, and
returns to college remain large (as in the data). Research on financial constraints should keep
this in mind: it is not just the exogenous (enrollment) margin that matters, the endogenous
(college choice) margin may be more important. This is especially true when subsidized
public options are available at the lower end of the spectrum.
Inter-vivos transfers are an important source of college financing. Gale and Scholz (1994) dis-
cuss how these transfers are distributed empirically. The model distribution of these transfers,
displayed in Figure 1.9 (where transfers are normalized by average labor earnings in a model
period), resembles the data: it is heavily right-skewed, with a mass point at zero, and trans-
fers are generally larger for those that go to college than for those that do not. Substantial
grants also go to those who do not go to college: this is due to the model structure, in which
there is only one moment for parents to act on their altruistic preferences.
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Figure 1.9: Distributions of Inter-Vivos Transfers
Grants and subsidies have been discussed above. Student loans are the remaining form of
student aid. The model’s parameters that regulate Stafford loans were set to match overall
subsidized and unsubsidized loan amounts, as well as their relative limits. The model also
makes predictions on the fraction of students that take up loans. The fraction of students
with subsidized Stafford loans was 37.3% in 2000, and the same fraction for unsubsidized
Stafford loans was 21.2% (Abbott et al., 2013). These moments and their model equivalent are
displayed in Table 1.7. Clearly, the model does not do a good job at matching loan uptake at
the extensive margin. As a result, the model has too many students taking up loans, and too
little loans per student, compared to the data. This would be a result of missing heterogeneity
of eligibility, for example because eligibility in reality is tied to additional conditions, such
as actual college expenses. Given the complexity of modeling such conditions, I have focused
on matching overall loan availability at the expense of generating a realistic cross-sectional
pattern of loan uptake. A similar comment applies to the modeling of inter-vivos transfers: the
model presumably misses some sources of heterogeneity here too, for example in preferences,
that would make financing needs more heterogeneous.
The overal role of government in the model is in line with the data. First, public spending
on education, which in our model includes institutional grants, is about 1% to 1.5% of GDP
depending on sources.21 Second, government expenditures amounted to 36.6% of GDP in
21For example, NIPA reports public expenditures of 0.91% of GDP for 2003, while institutional grants
amounted to .16% of GDP (making for a total of 1.07%).
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Table 1.7: Remaining Moments
Model Data
Share of students with Subsidized Stafford Loans 75% 37%
Share of students with Unsubsidized Stafford Loans 98% 21%
Public spending on education as % of GDP 0.77% 1.07%
Government expenditures as % of GDP 20.8% 37%
Weekly hours worked in college 33 >12
Weekly hours studied in college 15 <25
Frisch elasticity 1.20 >0.75
Wage premium 1.61 1.61
2003 according to the OECD. The model economy includes numerous sources of taxation but
not all, so that it underestimates the size of the government somewhat. Model counterparts
to both figures are reported in Table 1.7.
The final source of college financing is time use: students can choose how much time to
spend working instead of studying or enjoying leisure. The ratio of time spent on education
versus at work has already been targeted. As mentioned, quality data points on time use
by students are hard to come by. Comparing the model to the data on this issue is difficult
for a further reason: in the model, students are identified by enrollment, and therefore in
principle include drop-outs, part-time students, students in two-year programs, and so forth,
for an entire four year period. In spite of these issues, I produce model predictions of time
use levels in Table 1.7. They are in line with sources other than those already reported from:
Data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2017) lead to an estimate of 12.24
hours worked per week for a full time student (a lower bound for the model). According to
the calculations by the Bureau of Labor Statistics based on data from the Amerian Time
Use Survey22, an average full time student spends 3.5 hours a day (or 24.5 hours a week) on
educational activities (an upper bound for the model).
1.5.5 Labor Earnings
Labor earnings are front and center in the model presented here. How do these look in the
model versus in the data? Some of the model’s parameters have been tied down targeting
age-earnings profiles from Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011), as discussed above. Figure
1.10 shows these profiles in full, together with their model equivalents. The model matches
the earnings life-cycle overall, although with a shortage of curvature. This is also the case
in the work by Huggett et al., who take a similar approach. The model also generates too
22https://www.bls.gov/tus/charts/students.htm, data are from the period 2011-2015.
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strong an increase in the variance of log labor earnings.
Figure 1.10: Age-Earnings Profiles
Figure 1.11 displays the model distribution of earnings, with average earnings normalized to
one. The model distribution has much in common with the well-known empirical distribution,
specifically that it is right-skewed and has a long right tail. Unreported results show a
distribution of wealth with a significant population of indebted agents, and a large mass of
agents with close to zero asset holdings. However, the wealth distribution does not produce
the large right tail that is observed in data. This is due to the fact that the model does not
include inheritances, nor inter-vivos transfers at ages other than the start of adult life. It also
does not include a retirement period. Age-savings profiles also reflect the model structure:
assets gradually deplete after an initial receipt of parental transfers, and the average agent
starts building up savings again towards age 40. That build-up of assets is temporarily
interrupted by inter-vivos transfers to children.
Frisch elasticities are typically used to measure the responsiveness of labor supply in macro
models. Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) argues for Frisch elasticities of 0.75 in
macro models, but Keane and Rogerson (2012) argue that values well over one are more in
line with the data once human capital is taken into account. The model’s implied average
Frisch elasticity is in that region, see Table 1.7.
Finally, the raw college premium at age 32, the ratio between the average wages of those
with 16 years of education or more over the average wages of those with less, is 1.61. This is
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of Labor Earnings
taken from a sample of the 2000 US Census, obtained from IPUMS.23 The model generates
a figure that is in line with this measure (see Table 1.7).
1.6 Counterfactuals
This section uses counterfactual policies to draw lessons from the model. It does so by
comparing stationary equilibria of the model economy.
1.6.1 A Decomposition of Earnings Persistence
There are three intergenerational links in the model: ability is correlated over generations,
parents can transfer money to their children, and education policies take into account
parental wages. Education policies, in turn, consist of a subsidized public college, grants,
and (Subsidized and Unsubsidized) Stafford student loans.24
We can decompose the intergenerational persistence of earnings into its components. I start
by removing each of the links. First, I remove all persistence from the ability transition matrix
by assigning an equal probability to each destination level of ability (for each starting level).
23The bottom 1% of incomes are dropped, as are those who work less than 40 weeks a year or less than
35 hours a week. The Census’ own top-coding corrections are accepted as is.
24Access to public college is not conditional on parental earnings, but I include this policy in my decom-
position nevertheless.
53
Second, I set ω, the parameter that determines the extent to which parents internalize the
well-being of their children, to zero. As a result, parents will no longer make any inter-vivos
transfers. Third, subsidies to the public college, student grants, and loan limits are all set to
zero. I then undo each of these changes, going in the same order. The results are displayed
in Table 1.8. I display both the IGE and the rank correlation measure of intergenerational
persistence, and also provide a break-down in percentages of the baseline model. Earnings
are measured at age 36 for both generations, so that the measures are as clean as possible.
Table 1.8: Decomposition of Intergenerational Persistence
IGE Rank Corr. Ability IV-transfers Policies
Persistent Full Full
0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%)
0.06 (38%) 0.08 (53%) !
0.10 (63%) 0.10 (67%) ! !
0.16 (100%) 0.15 (100%) ! ! !
Roughly half of intergenerational persistence in the baseline model is driven by ability (as
measured at age 18) alone. The remainder is split between inter-vivos transfers and education
policies, with the former accounting for about a third and the latter for two-thirds. Here,
it is important to note that when education policies are absent, inter-vivos transfers will
adjust. That adjustment mechanism is important when measuring the effect of policies, as
has previously been analyzed in work by Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2013).
Is the effect of transfers due to the level of the transfers or their distribution? These two
component can be separated by an extra experiment in which all agents are given the average
transfer (measured in the experiment with transfers but without policies). Unreported results
show that this hardly changes persistence from the experiment without transfers. In short,
it is not the level of the transfers that matters, but who gets them. Transfers matter because
they help pay for college.
How important are different policies? We can investigate this by re-activating them one-
by-one, starting with the public college, then grants, and then subsidized and unsubsidized
loans. Table 1.9 presents the results. In each case, inter-vivos transfers and other choices have
been allowed to adjust. It turns out that all policies increase persistence, with loans having
the strongest impact. This is in line with the theoretical ambiguity discussed in Section 1.2,
to which we will return below.
Again we can ask whether it is the level of these policies or their distribution that matters.
Similar to the case for transfers, I run two extra experiments. The first gives the average
grant (measured in the experiment with grants but without loans) to all that enroll in
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college. The second gives the average loan (measured in the baseline model) to all that enroll
in college. Giving average grants actually reduces persistence compared to the experiment
without grants. The same applies to loans: giving average loans reduces persistence compared
to the experiment without loans.
A look back at the distribution of aid in Figure 1.7 clarifies why. It is students from high-
income families that receive most aid. This, in turn, is a consequence of their higher spending
on education: in the data, grants are strongly related to college sticker prices. Redistributing
aid evenly results in a policy that is more targeted at low-income students, which is where
the positive effect on intergenerational mobility comes from. This brings us to the next
lesson from these extra experiments: while policies modeled after actual policies increase
persistence, there are some policies that reduce persistence. The effect of education policies
on intergenerational mobility depends on the shape the policies takes. We will return to this
below.
Table 1.9: Decomposition by Specific Policies
IGE Rank Corr. Public Grants Loans
College Subs. Unsubs.
0.10 (63%) 0.10 (67%)
0.10 (63%) 0.11 (73%) !
0.12 (75%) 0.13 (87%) ! !
0.15 (94%) 0.14 (93%) ! ! !
0.16 (100%) 0.15 (100%) ! ! ! !
Regarding the sources of persistence, it remains to note that the effect of education policies
is significant in size: it is of the same order of magnitude as cross-country differences in
persistence. It is also comparable to the effect of significant reductions of tax progressivity,
which have been reported as important drivers of mobility elsewhere in the literature.
1.6.2 Removing Borrowing Constraints
Typically, the stated goal of government student loan schemes is to alleviate borrowing
constraints that students would otherwise face.25 I will now study how intergenerational
25There are two reasons why the first welfare theorem breaks down in the environment this paper studies.
First, government taxation drives a wedge between the private and social returns of labor, and therefore
between the private and social returns to education. This creates creates complex optimal policies that have
filled an extensive literature (see Section 1.1.2 for an introduction). I will not engage with the issue here.
Second, markets are incomplete for two reasons: wages are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, and potential
students have limited access to borrowing.
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persistence would look if all borrowing constrains on students were alleviated. Specifically, I
remove all education policies (including the public college), and then let all students borrow
up to the natural borrowing limit in period zero. I treat this experiment as if the government
is providing loans at market rates. Any net loss to the government from this change comes
out of government expenditure.
Table 1.10: Removing the Borrowing Limit
IGE Rank Corr. Baseline Optimal
0.16 (100%) 0.15 (100%) !
0.15 (94%) 0.14 (93%) ! !
Table 1.10 reports the results of this experiment. Both measures of persistence move, but
the effects are small. This is not because removing borrowing limits has no effects: education
investment is much larger than in the baseline model. Instead, opposing effects on mobility,
to be discussed below, cancel each other out.
What happens to educational choices when there are no constraints to borrowing? All poten-
tial students in the top four ability quintiles go to college, raising overall college enrollment
to 80%. None of these students go to the public college, because their optimal investment
level turns out to be much larger than the investment the public college makes. Investment
quadruples for those that spent least before. Figure 1.12 shows investment by the same groups
as before, and compares this to the baseline model. Differences in the investment level by
ability almost disappear. The remaining college heterogeneity is much smaller, indicating
that most college heterogeneity is due to financial constraints at the intensive margin.
Other model variables change as well. Average labor earnings increase by 14%. The college
premium (measured at age 32) increases to 2.23 (a 39% increase). The composition of college
financing changes: IV-transfers are now only used to redistribute assets to children and not
to finance college. As a result they are now lower for those that go to college than or those
that do not. Hours worked in college are almost zero. At the same time, hours studied
(which are a complement to monetary investment) increase threefold. All of these suggest
the presence of intensive margin constraints in college choice: in reality, students do work
in college, and parental transfers do correlate with college spending. Finally, the patterns
in Figure 1.4 (‘access’, ‘success’, and ‘mobility’) remain qualitatively similar, but access to
high-investment colleges for students from low-income families does improve significantly.
56
Figure 1.12: Average Investment in Education: Unconstrained versus Baseline
The wider bars represent the unconstrained case.
The thinner bars refer to the baseline model, and display the same data as Figure 1.7.
1.6.3 Exploring the Effect of Education Policies
Let us return to the discussion in Section 1.2. There, equation 1.2 established the following
decomposition of the IGE (of wages, ignoring labor supply):
βIGE =
Cor(log h, log h′)V ar(log h) +
[
Cor(log x, log h′)
√
V ar(log h)√
V ar(log x)
]
V ar(log x)
V ar(log h) + V ar(log x)
The point was the following: the impact of education policies is theoretically ambiguous,
because they have two opposing effects. Relieving financial constraints makes children less
dependent on their parents. This reduces both correlations in the above formula. However,
the IGE is a weighted average of the two, so that changes in the weights are crucial. If policies
increase the variance of log human capital, emphasis will shift to the first correlation, which
is typically the larger of the two. As a result, measured persistence may go up rather than
down.
Table 1.11 reproduces Table 1.1, but now provides model-based measurements of each of
the terms. The constrained case refers to the model without any education policies. The
unconstrained model is the case discussed above in which students can borrow at market
rates up to the natural borrowing constraint.
The unconstrained policy reduces the persistence of human capital. This is as expected,
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because removing borrowing constraints allows smart children from low-income families to
invest in their education. The second term of the weighted average that makes up the IGE is
small, and even zero in the case without constraints. Crucially, the variance of human capital
more than doubles when the constraints are removed. This shifts the weight in the weighted
average to the first term, which is larger than the second one. Human capital becomes a
more important component of earnings persistence. As a result, removing the constraints
has an adverse effect on intergenerational mobility.
Table 1.11: The effect of financial constraints on the IGE
Unconstrained Constrained
Cor(log h, log h′) 0.46 0.48[
Cor(log x, log h′)
√
V ar(log h)√
V ar(log x)
]
0.00 0.03
V ar(log x) 0.08 0.08
V ar(log h) 0.16 0.07
βIGE (wage rates) 0.29 0.24
βIGE 0.15 0.10
It is perhaps here where the paper’s main point is borne out best. We have seen above that
education policies modeled after current US policy increase intergenerational persistence on
the whole. Now we observe that there is a direct trade-off between intergenerational mobility
and efficiency in a classical sense: when we consider the effect of a policy that removes bor-
rowing constraints, earnings become more persistent across generations. Removing borrowing
constraints achieves a Pareto improvement, but reduces intergenerational mobility.
A similar analysis can be used to compare the unconstrained policy (where loans are available
at will, but no other education policies are in place) to the model’s baseline. Table 1.12 shows
that the unconstrained policy generates more mobility in human capital, and this time it does
translate to more mobility in earnings. This highlights the extent to which grant schedules
are currently skewed towards students from high-income families. Just making loans available
does a better job at generating mobility (both in human capital an earnings) than do current
policies.
Again the particulars of policies are important. Targeting grants and loans more towards low-
income students would potentially lead to policies that increase intergenerational mobility.
However, that does not take away from the trade-off this paper finds: policies that release
constraints for high-income students are welfare improving too, but reduce intergenerational
mobility.
The above analyses also highlight the importance of idiosyncratic shocks in the model. If
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Table 1.12: The effect of financial constraints on the IGE
Unconstrained Baseline
Cor(log h, log h′) 0.46 0.53[
Cor(log x, log h′)
√
V ar(log h)√
V ar(log x)
]
0.00 0.05
V ar(log x) 0.08 0.08
V ar(log h) 0.16 0.11
βIGE (wage rates) 0.29 0.31
βIGE 0.15 0.16
one were to directly measure the persistence of human capital, education policies would
unambiguously reduce persistence. However, earnings are determined by more than human
capital alone. Indeed, a long literature has established the importance of earnings shocks,
both transitory and permanent, which are best thought of as all components that one might
describe as ‘luck’. This paper’s parameterization of idiosyncratic shocks builds upon that
literature.
What about the assumption that all individuals are subject to the same idiosyncratic shocks?
Crucially, if education also increases the ‘luck’ component in earnings, then our model would
overestimate the positive effect education policies have on persistence. A review of the lit-
erature on earnings shocks suggests that this is not the case: more educated individuals
are subject to similar, or even somewhat smaller idiosyncratic income risks than are less
educated individuals. For example, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) report that the variance
of unexplained earnings growth in their setup falls in education. Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir,
and Violante (2013) provide further evidence, and find little difference over education groups
for persistent shocks, and a variance of non-persistent shocks that is smaller for the more
educated. Finally, the findings of Blundell, Graber, and Mogstad (2015) for Norwegian ad-
ministrative data do not contradict these conclusions. In short, the key modeling assumption
on earnings shocks in this paper is conservative with respect to the main result.
1.7 Conclusion
Using a combination of theory and data, this paper has attempted to explore the connection
between higher education policies and intergenerational mobility. It has shown that a human
capital-based model does a surprisingly good job at explaining the persistence of earnings
across generations, as well as its relation to college choice. We now know that the relation
between higher education policies and intergenerational mobility is theoretically ambiguous.
Going one step further, the parameterized model of this paper suggests that common higher
education policies actually decrease intergenerational mobility.
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This surprising finding is due to the fact that earnings do not just originate from human
capital, but are at least also due to luck. Education policies that increase the mobility of
human capital also decreases the importance of luck, thereby making earnings more persistent
over generations overall. This has important implications for policy makers: First, they should
not use higher education policies to target intergenerational mobility. Second, they should
be careful not to interpret lower levels of intergenerational mobility as bad outcomes. As
this paper has shown, they may just be the result of Pareto-improving policy. Second, to see
whether education policies induce mobility in a desirable sense, one might want to measure
the persistence of human capital, for example using test scores, rather than the persistence
of earnings.
Several directions may be worth pursuing in further research. The paper introduces a model
of colleges in a competitive landscape that other researchers may find useful. Some of the
predictions that model makes have been discussed, but there are more. For example on the
interplay between endowments and institutional grants. Connecting the model to data on
colleges may prove fruitful.
The topic of college heterogeneity, which this work has shown to be important in a number
of respects, may also warrant further exploration. In particular, government-based systems
of higher education (as they are found in some European countries) often lack heterogeneity,
which may have consequences for welfare, inequality, and intergenerational mobility.
As this paper has shown, college heterogeneity is also important for the study of financial
constraints: even when all potential students can afford to go to some college (the extensive
margin of college choice), they may not be able to enroll in the college that is best for them
(the intensive margin of college choice). This finding would be complemented by direct em-
pirical evidence. Indeed, most empirical literature on financial constraints looks at whether
students are constrained from entering some college (see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a)
for an overview), or are constrained when already in college (e.g. Stinebrickner and Stine-
brickner, 2008). But to what extent are students constrained when choosing which college
to attend?
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Computation
The computational procedure, for given parameter values, that produces the results in this
paper proceeds as follows.
1. Guess the initial value function at independence V (because we interpolate between
grid points, guesses at grid points are sufficient).
2. Solve the individual’s problem. I elaborate on this below. This results in an updated
function V .
3. Update V (i.e. repeat from step 1) until convergence.
4. Simulate households. This is done by randomly assigning initial states, and then sim-
ulating a household for many generations. Using a large number of households and a
large number of generations per household, we arrive at a stationary distribution of
the economy.
The individual problem is solved by backward induction. Because each life-cycle starts with
a discrete choice, value functions will have kinks and (through inter-generational links that
reach back many generations) so-called ‘second-order kinks’. Thus, inter-temporal first-order
conditions do not apply. Instead, the optimization to solve individual problems is done over
time use using robust multi-level grid methods at each step of the life cycle. Leisure is assumed
to always be interior, deviations from which are treated as a numerical imprecision.26
The code for this procedure was written in Fortran90 and parallelized using OpenMPI.
26The fraction of individuals that chooses zero work time is tiny, which is due to the absence of bequests
in the model.
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1.8.2 Student Aid in the United States
This appendix describes US tertiary education policies around 2003. Fuller (2014) provides
a more detailed description of the history of US education policies.
Table 1.13: Education policies in 2003
Student Aid (as % of total, or in millions of 2012 USD)
2003
Grants (non-institutional)
Pell 54%
Other Federal (mostly military) 19%
State 27%
Total $ 27,461
% of GDP 0.19%
Institutional Grants $ 22,470
% of GDP 0.16%
Public Sector Loans
Stafford, subsidized 44%
Stafford, unsubsidized 38%
PLUS 11%
Other Federal 4%
State and Institution Sponsored Loans 3%
Total $ 56,280
% of GDP 0.40%
Private Sector Loans $ 8,900
% of GDP 0.06%
Sources: author calculations; College Board (2013); CPI
from the St. Louis FRED database; GDP from the World
Bank’s WDI.
Table 1.13 provides an overview of the student aid landscape in 2003. Government interven-
tion generally consists of grants and loans. The largest uniform grant program is the Pell
grant program, which provides grants to college students depending on financial need. Other
programs are sizable but spread thin, with most of the money coming from states or military
(including veteran) related programs. Institutional grants are of a similar order of magnitude
as non-institutional grants. This uncovers a serious issue with using headline costs of college
to calibrate models with an extensive margin: institutional grants are essentially discounts
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to attending a college, and given their size the headline costs can hardly be taken to be
the price of college. In addition, colleges often discount prices based on both financial need
and merit. To account well for that complicated landscape, this paper relies on linked micro
survey data on students and the colleges they go to.
Public sector loans, the other major policy instrument, largely consist of Stafford loans.
These loans, in their subsidized version, provide student loans to students from lower income
families at below market rates. Interest accrued during college is forgiven. Unsubsidized loans
have higher interest rates and no accrual forgiveness, but are easily available to students
regardless of family income. Subsidized and unsubsidized loans are subject to a joint limit,
in addition to a separate limit on subsidized loans. Stafford loans are explicitly modeled and
calibrated in this paper.
The other major loan programs are PLUS loans and Perkins loans. The availability of PLUS
loans in practice strongly depends on parental credit scores, and are essentially a way for par-
ents to transfer privately borrowed funds to children. This mechanism is separately present
in the model through inter-vivos transfers, so that PLUS loans are not modeled explicitly.
The Perkins loan program is small in size, and also not modeled.
Private student loan markets were small in 2003. Why this is so, not only in the United States
but globally, is a topic of research in its own right. Here I put forward the following narrative:
in the face of regular consumer bankruptcy regulation, private student loan markets are
unlikely to develop at all (cf. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b)). Public student loans,
presumably for the same reason, have historically been exempted from discharge in regular
bankruptcy proceedings. Importantly, this exemption was extended to any non-profit entity
in 1985, allowing many financial institutions to structure their loans such that they were
immune to discharge (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2012) and the private student
loan market to develop.
Despite the discharge exemption, private student loans are not widely available: for example,
90% of undergraduate and 75% of graduate private student loans in 2012 were co-signed
(MeasureOne, 2013). Without a co-signer, students typically lack a credit history that would
allow them to take out a loan at competitive interest rates, but those that do take out these
loans tend to get them at rates that are attractive compared to unsubsidized Stafford loans
(Institute for Higher Education Policy, 2003). Because of their limited size, as well as their
limited relevance to those students that are likely to face financial constraints in the absence
of any loans, this paper does not model private loans.
Default on student loans are not part of this paper. It is precisely the exemption from
discharge that makes this a less relevant issue for the purposes of this paper: students may
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default, but then still have to repay their student loans. In fact, the College Board (2013)
documents that over 90% of federal student loan dollars that enter default are eventually
recovered.
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Chapter 2
Polarization: A Supply-Side
Mechanism
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
The effect of tax incentives on the formation of human capital have been studied extensively,
both in positive (e.g. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan, 2014) and normative (e.g. Stantcheva,
2017) contexts. This paper studies the incentive effects of taxation when human capital
is multi-dimensional and the labor market is cleared in general equilibrium. Our results
shed new light on relative movements of the earnings distribution. First, the presence of
multi-dimensional skills can rationalize the relative unresponsiveness of low earnings to tax
incentives. Second, we present a novel labor supply-driven mechanism for polarization of the
earnings distribution to arise. The interaction between accumulation incentives and general
equilibrium effects turns out to be key for the generation of non-monotone changes to the
earnings distribution.
Tax progressivity is substantially different both across countries and over time. Since the
1970s, tax levels and progressivity in the United States have fallen dramatically. Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) estimate tax schedules on OECD data for the years 1973 and
2003. Both average (t(y)) and marginal (t′(y)) tax rates for the US are depicted in Figure
2.1.1 Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) argue that high levels of taxes, and especially
tax progressivity, play an important role in shaping the earnings distribution by reducing
1Cross-country differences in tax progressivity and the relationship to inequality measures are plotted
further below in Figure 2.6.
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optimal human capital investments, particularly for the highly skilled. Taxes then compress
the distribution of earnings. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan argue that their mechanism
explains changes in earnings inequality both across countries and over time, showing that it
explains up to two-thirds of the change in the US wage premium between 1973 and 2003.2
Figure 2.1: Tax rates in the United States
While Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014)’s results are suggestive, Skill-Biased Techno-
logical Change (SBTC) has been the main explanatory model of why inequality grew so
strongly over recent decades in the United States (Katz and Murphy, 1992) and elsewhere
(Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998). According to the SBTC theory, increased supplies of
highly educated labor keep the wage premium to education down, while technological change
that is biased towards skilled labor continuously drives it up. In the 1980s the growth of ed-
ucational attainment slowed down, explaining why inequality took off. In this type of theory,
human capital is essentially considered two-dimensional, and general equilibrium effects are
the main driver.
The perhaps primary challenge to both types of models is the ‘polarization’ phenomenon:
the observation that starting in the 1980s jobs in the middle of the earnings distribution
have seen less growth in wages and employment than those at the top or bottom, both in the
US (Autor and Dorn, 2013) and across advanced economies (Goos, Manning, and Salomons,
2014). This coincided with growth in overall earnings inequality, i.e. a growing difference
between the top and the bottom. Figure 2.2 displays these phenomena for the United States.
2All this is much in line with ideas from a public economics literature that considers how taxes are
set optimally when human capital is endogenous (see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) for a static setting,
and Stantcheva (2017) for a dynamic extension). In this line of research, human capital is considered one-
dimensional, and general equilibrium effects on wages play no role. Recently, a literature has developed
that considers the original Mirrlees problem when many types interact in general equilibrium. A recent
contribution is by Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2016). The formation of types (or human capital) has
so far been taken as exogenous. The same applies to previous work by Teulings (2005), which provided a
framework for tracing out general equilibrium effects across many types.
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A number of explanations have been put forward to explain what is different about jobs
in the middle of the income distribution, such as offshorability or competition from China
or declines in unionization rates in the manufacturing sector, but consensus has formed
around the view that these jobs have a higher degree of ’routineness’, and are therefore more
susceptible to automation (by machines, robots, and computers). In short, polarization of
the labor market is seen as demand-driven, and attributed to exogenous technological forces.
See Autor et al. (2010) for a review of this literature.
Figure 2.2: Wage Inequality Growth and Polarization in the United States
This paper takes an entirely different and complementary approach. It extends the analysis of
incentive changes as in Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014) to a multi-dimensional setting,
in which there is also a role for the general equilibrium effects of Katz and Murphy (1992).
Thus, it combines both of the established approaches to earnings inequality discussed above.3
We begin our analysis with a set of empirical results. Analyzing data on occupational skills
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) combined with Census data, this paper
establishes that there seem to be two relevant dimensions of job skills: cognitive and manual
skills, both of which can be thought of as continuous variables. We find the importance
3A similar setup has been used by Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010) and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2012)
to study skill-biased technological change. However, in both papers the general equilibrium wage effect is
deliberately shut off by choosing a linear production technology. This precludes interaction effects between
relative skill quantities and prices of the type we study in this paper.
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of these skills to be heterogeneous over the distribution of earnings: manual skills play a
relatively larger role at the bottom of the distribution, cognitive skills play a larger role at
the top. Similar to Katz and Murphy, the cognitive skills coincide heavily with schooling
decisions. We discuss the details of this analysis in Section 2.2.
Taken together, these points have important implications for the impact of tax incentives:
First, those incentives are more relevant for those at the top of the income distribution than
those at the bottom. This is because cognitive skills are subject to individual investment –
and therefore incentives – to a much larger extend than manual skills, and because cognitive
skills dominate at the top of the income distribution. Second, in general equilibrium, a change
in the relative amount of cognitive skills may affect the relative prices of the two skill types
and therefore individual earnings - a channel that is absent in models of one-dimensional
human capital, but common in the literature on SBTC.
Motivated by these empirical findings, Section 2.3 sets out a simple life-cycle model in which
earnings are derived from cognitive and manual skills, cognitive skills are subject to en-
dogenous investment decisions and relative wages are determined in general equilibrium.
Importantly, in our model of skills it is not different education levels that map into different
skill types as is standard in the literature.4 Instead, both skill types are continuous, and one
of them is formed by education. In Section 2.4 we use a simpler and more tractable repre-
sentation of the model to study the effects of tax progressivity in our setting theoretically.
We emphasize two implications: inequality and polarization.
First, our mechanism impacts inequality. Just like in the uniform human capital model, a
decline in tax progressivity impacts the top of the income distribution more than the bottom,
thereby increasing income inequality in absolute terms. This is because, in typical human
capital models, the more able spend more time learning, and tax progressivity reduces the
private gains from having learned earlier in life.
Two things are different in the multi-dimensional case, causing polarization to arise. First,
the heterogeneous impact of taxes becomes much stronger, so that income inequality also
increases in relative terms. This is because lower tax progressivity increases the relative
supply of cognitive skills more than that of manual skills, thereby increasing the latter’s
relative price. This lowers incentives to acquire cognitive skills. Second, the increasing relative
price of manual skills, which are more important at the bottom of the income distribution,
makes earnings at the bottom of the distribution even less sensitive to progressivity. If this
effect is strong enough, it can even increase the wages of those at the bottom relatively more
4One notable exception is Lindenlaub (2017). She analyzes a matching model with multi-dimensional
skills and shows how different rates of technological change between different skills can lead to polarization.
Unlike in our model, she takes all skills as exogenously given.
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than of those at middling levels of the distribution. In short, the tails of the distribution
potentially respond relatively stronger to changes in tax progressivity, with a reduction
in progressivity causing polarization in earnings. We discuss the underlying mechanism in
further detail in Section 2.4.
The earnings distribution is likely subject to a multitude of economic forces and no single
mechanism will be able to fully account for the changes that took place during the period in
which polarization arose. We argue that our mechanism potentially contributes in addition
to the existing mechanisms put forward in the literature, but do not claim it as the sole
driver of the observed changes. In this paper, we attempt to study our supply-side mecha-
nism in isolation. That limits the extent to which we can observe its empirical implications
in data. Nevertheless, we include a qualitative comparison of the model’s macro-economic
implications to data, both over countries and across time, in Section 2.5. The model predicts
non-linear patterns of (relative) change in income distributions due to tax changes. While,
as we discuss in detail, some of these patterns could also be generated by alternative setups
with one-dimensional human capital, our theoretical exposition demonstrates that multi-
dimensional models have a much easier time to account for such movements. Using OECD
data on income distributions across countries and over time, we construct measures of in-
come inequality and measures of tax progressivity across countries. Patterns that are easily
accounted for by our multi-dimensional model are pervasive. We also discuss implications
for changes over time, and the limitations present in verifying these.
Section 2.6 takes an enriched version of the model developed in Section 2.3 that can be
solved numerically. Parameters are now tied down so that the baseline version of the enriched
model matches relevant moments of the US economy. The model is then used to study the
quantitative impact of a typical decline in tax progressivity.5 In order to do so, we use the
decline of US tax progressivity since the 1980s that we discussed above as our experiment. We
calibrate the model economy to match moments from the US economy in the early 2000s. We
then compare the steady-state earnings distribution of this economy with the counter-factual
tax progressivity of 1983 to the one in 2003 and calculate the rate of change in earnings.
The main goal of this exercise is to gauge the general quantitative “bite” of the human capital
investment channel on changes in the earnings distribution, rather than wanting to account
for the empirical change in earnings growth over the same period. This would require at the
5In this paper, we focus on tax progressivity. As Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan demonstrate, allowing
for flexible labor supply makes tax levels a disincentive in the accumulation of human capital as well.In the
context of a cross-country comparison, Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan find that differences in tax progressivity
are a more important determinant of differences in inequality than are differences average tax rates, explaining
our focus on the former.
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very least taking into account the transition period as well as cohort composition effects,
both of which our model is silent on. More generally, we are looking at our mechanism in
isolation, whereas in reality several channels are likely to have played a role in the rise of
polarization. The results from the experiment indicate that the model captures growth in
overall wage inequality reasonably well. Most of the change comes out of the upper half of
the income distribution, in line with the empirical evidence. The results further indicate that
the polarization effect exists, and is quantitatively sizable but smaller than what we observe
empirically. In conclusion, our mechanism has impact under quantitatively relevant variations
in policy. We also argue why our estimate of the mechanisms quantitative implications might
be seen as a lower bound.
Our results contribute to two separate literatures. First, they provide a natural explanation
for the lack of response in the lower half of the income distribution to changes in the human
capital accumulation incentive structure. Existing papers focusing on uniform human capital,
such as Guvenen et al. (2014), lack explanatory power in this region of the distribution.
By adding the general equilibrium relative price effect, our model complements the direct
incentive effect studied in their paper with the general equilibrium price effect. The latter
works primarily in the lower half of the distribution and helps to limit the increase in total
inequality.
Second, existing theories of polarization are primarily labor demand driven. Autor and Dorn
(2013) introduce a third ’routine’ skill category and explain polarization through increasing
automation of ’routine’-intensive tasks, reducing the demand for jobs located in the middle
of the skill distribution. By adding general equilibrium relative price effects to the traditional
skilled-unskilled dichotomy of the endogenous human capital literature, we are able to gener-
ate qualitatively similar changes in the earnings distribution without resorting to a third type
of skill. Given the complexity of the earnings distribution, there are likely many underlying
factors at work. Consequently, we see our channel as complementary to the skill-demand
based explanations put forward in the existing literature.
Throughout, we emphasize that taxation is just one particular type of disincentive to human
capital formation. In principle, there are many other distortions driving a wedge between
public and private returns to education that differ across parts of the population. Two of the
major trends in the 2nd half of the 20th century have been declines in gender and race based
discrimination, both in education and the labor market. Hsieh et al. (2016) attribute about
25% of total economic growth in the US between 1960 and 2010 to changes in discrimination
against women and minorities. It also seems reasonable to think that these trends correspond
to a reduction in wedge progressivity, since discrimination seems like a particularly salient
issue towards the top of the distribution. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, one may want
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to think of ‘wedges’ more generally whenever we discuss taxes. Our quantitative results regard
taxation only, so that investigating the role of discrimination for polarization is our main
suggestion for further research. Section 2.7 concludes and provides further such directions
for future research.
2.2 Manual and Cognitive Skills
We use data on the skill content of a number of occupations provided by the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles. We analyze the structure of these data using a statistical technique
(Principal Compenent Analysis) that allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the data and
subsequently interpret them. We fin that skills are best summed up by two dimensions:
cognitive and manual skills, both of which are important. In order to map the skill content
into the wage distribution, we link the DOT data to the Census. This also enables us to
investigate how skill measures relate to other observables, such as education. It turns out
that the cognitive component of skills is strongly correlated to measures of education, while
the manual component is not. Below, we discuss our data sources in more detail. Empirical
methodology and results are presented thereafter.
The main drawback of our type of analysis is that we look for underlying skill categories in
the data per se, i.e. not in relation to the wages or schooling decisions we expect them to
explain. Our results in first instance only aim to have explanatory power with regards to
the questions and answers observed in the DOT. Several arguments speak for our approach
nevertheless. First, the clear advantage of this approach is that our measures are in some
sense still direct measures of skills, even if they are compounded and rely on analysts. Any
explanatory power they have in our further analysis is not due to how we have produced
them. Second, and related, the questions included in the DOT were included for a reason:
because they were believed to be relevant measures of occupational skill. Last but not least,
there is a related literature in which data on skills are directly related to wages. The most
important reference in this regard is Yamaguchi (2012), who estimates a structural model
of wage development in relation to unobserved skills using the same data on occupational
skills as we do. He also finds two underlying skill factors to be of major importance, which
he refers to as cognitive and motor tasks.
2.2.1 Data
DOT
We use the ‘Current Population Survey (CPS), April 1971, Augmented With DOT Char-
acteristics and Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)’, obtained from the IPCSR. This
71
version of the CPS was augmented with data on occupation characteristics from the 4th edi-
tion of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The 4th edition of the DOT is unique,
in the sense that it is the final edition of the so-called ‘Analyst Database’. Over centuries,
starting in the mid-1930s, the United States Employment Service led an effort to system-
atically document the skills required to perform a range of occupations. This was done by
sending trained occupational analysts to job sites, where they would complete standardized
questionnaires on occupation content. While the database was revised since, the focus after
the 4th edition of the DOT shifted to the generation of O*NET data, which are based on
surveys of employees and employers, and therefore much less suitable for comparison across
occupations. Following much of the literature, we therefore choose to use the 4th edition
DOT. The main advantage of using the augmented CPS database is that it provides us with
numbers of workers per occupation in the original DOT occupation classification.
The 4th edition DOT provides information on 46 variables of skills needed for and character-
istics of 3886 DOT occupations (some examples: Marine Architect, Die-Designer Apprentice,
Weather Observer, Hypnotherapist). In the nationally representative CPS database that we
use, we also have a proportion of the working population for each of these occupations. The
46 variables consist of the analyst’s answers to a wide variety of questions per occupation:
1. To what extent does the job relate to data, people, things? (3 questions)
2. What educational development is required (reasoning, mathematical, language, voca-
tional)? (4 questions)
3. To what extent are aptitudes like intelligence important, or finger dexterity? (11 ques-
tions)
4. What temperaments relate to some occupation? (10 questions)
5. What are the physical demands of the job? (6 questions)
6. What physical environment does the job take place in? (7 questions)
7. To what interests does the job relate? (5 questions)
The survey includes clear and detailed instructions on how to answer these questions, making
the answers comparable across occupations. In addition, many questions include a grading
scale that seemingly targets the possibility of cardinal comparison. Whether cardinal inter-
pretation is appropriate depends on the context, but clearly information is lost when not
using these scales in some cardinal fashion. For example, aptitude ratings ask analysts to
decide which quintile of the population an occupation falls into. On some questions, however,
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analysts were only asked to indicate whether they are relevant to a job or not. In each case,
we convert the answers provided into numerical values.
Because the questions in the database vary in type and topic, and their number is large,
researchers typically make ex-ante decisions on which variables to use. For example, while
some questions clearly relate to skills, others clearly do not (such as interest and environment
variables). We try to keep any pre-selection to a minimum, and include the three categories
of questions on the DOT when we perform Principal Component Analysis. These categories,
comprising 18 questions, have in common that they must all be answered on a numeric scale
that suggests some form of cardinal interpretation. (This is generally not true for the other
categories: they are of the ‘yes or no’ type.) They also all clearly relate to skills, rather than
the environment or personal characteristics of the typical person performing the job. We
provide more detail on the 18 questions with our empirical results.
Census
We obtain a crosswalk between DOT occupation codes and Census 1990 occupation codes
from the Analyst Resource Center (amongst others associated with the US Department
of Labor). Whenever several DOT codes map into one census code, we take the average of
component scores as the component score for that Census occupation. This procedure results
in 452 occupations.
We use US Census data from IPUMS for all non-skill data (wages, hours worked, employment
shares over Census occupations, education, and so forth), where we take a random sample
of 50 thousand observations for each of the census years we use. Non-farm hourly wage
rates are constructed by combining wage income and non-farm business income, following
the example of the Census itself, and correcting for the number of weeks worked and the
number of hours worked in a typical week. We reflate all wages to 2012 levels using the ‘CPI
total items for the United States’ from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We remove all
occupations which are not present throughout our sample, as well as all farm occupations.
The final number of occupations for which we have data in our sample is 308.
Population percentiles are obtained as follows. For each occupation in our sample we obtain
mean hourly log wages wocc and the share of the population employed in the respective
occupation xocc. We sort occupations by their mean log hourly wage in 1980. We construct
percentile employment shares xperc and average wages wperc by mapping the occupation
population shares into population percentiles. In particular, we assign to each percentile,
the share of each occupation falling into the respective percentile using the 1980 population
share per occupation. Doing this, we obtain the following conversion matrix C of dimensions
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#occ× 100, which by definition maps the vector of occupation population share vector xocc
into population percentile vector xperc:
C ′1980x
occ
1980 = x
perc
1980 ≡ 1.
By construction, the population percentiles obtained in this way are 1 in 1980. Percentile
mean wages in 1980 are obtained by multiplying occupational mean wages with the conver-
sion matrix:
wperc1980 = C
′
1980w
perc
1980.
To obtain the change in employment shares between 1980 and 2010, we first calculate how
occupational employment changed in terms of 1980 percentiles and then compute the rate
of change. In particular, we take the conversion matrix from occupations into percentiles in
1980 and multiply it with the occupation employment share vector in 2010 as follows:
∆2010−1980xperc = C ′1980x
occ
2010 − xocc1980.
This calculation converts 2010 occupational population shares into the 1980 percentile bins. If
for an occupation the employment share increased (decreased) relative to 1980, this will result
in the respective population percentile to increase (decrease) as well.6 For the calculation of
changes of wages we similarly multiply the 1980 conversion matrix with 2010 occupational
mean log hourly wages and obtain the growth rate by taking the difference of the 2010 and
1980 percentile wages.
2.2.2 Empirics
PCA
The leftmost column of Table 2.1 shows the labels of the 18 DOT questions we include in
our analysis. This set is still large, so that we want to reduce it for more tractable empirical
analysis. We think of these skills as ex-ante equally important indicators of underlying core
skills, and want to find out what these underlying skills look like. One method that allows
doing so is Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
PCA is a relatively standard technique for dimension reduction, that creates new variables
by linear combinations of existing ones. Its objective is to maximize the variance of the
new variable, which is called a principle component. Each subsequent component’s vector of
6Note that by using this strategy, we are restricted to the analysis of occupations which are present in
both 1980 and 2010. Thus, we remain silent on the effects of vanishing and newly appearing occupations on
the aggregate wage and employment distribution. The procedure follows the approach taken by Autor and
Dorn (2013).
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weights to the variables is assumed orthogonal to the previous ones’. (To make this problem
well-defined, variables are first standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one,
and the total weight given to each of them is restricted to be no more than one.) The op-
timality condition for this problem is a simple eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition, which
yields as many components (eigenvectors) as there are variables, with all components orthog-
onal to each other. The corresponding eigenvalues relate directly to the variance accounted
for by each component. One can simply think of the components as new dimensions: the
dimensions are rotated such that the first dimension explains as much variance as possible,
thereafter the second, and so on. Thus, the components are identified up to sign and scaling.
Variance accounted for by each component are displayed in Figure 2.3. Clearly, the first
two components dominate the others in explanatory power: they jointly explain more than
60% of the variance in the data, while no other component explains more than 10%. The
third component and further component do not seem to pick up a fundamentally different
aspect of skills, but rather seem to modulate the first two. Full PCA results are included in
Appendix 2.8.1.
Figure 2.3: PCA Scree Plot
What do the components look like? Table 2.1 shows the correlation between the first two
components with the DOT skill measures over occupations (weighted by their share in em-
ployment). Those questions that are negatively correlated with the first component are high-
lighted. A brief study of the category groups with positive (negative) correlations with the
first (second) component unambiguously leads to the conclusion that the first component
relates to measures of cognitive ability, while the second component relates to physical skills.
75
Table 2.1: Component Correlations
Variable Component 1: ‘Cognitive’ Component 2: ‘Manual’
Data 0.49 -0.31
People 0.45 -0.27
Things -0.34 0.12
GED Reasoning 0.47 -0.36
GED Mathematical 0.46 -0.39
GED Language 0.48 -0.38
Specific Vocational Prep. 0.36 -0.22
Intelligence 0.51 -0.44
Verbal 0.51 -0.49
Numerical 0.43 -0.62
Spatial 0.05 0.41
Form Perception 0.05 -0.09
Clerical Perception 0.53 -0.51
Motor Coordination -0.44 -0.07
Finger Dexterity -0.63 -0.14
Manual Dexterity -0.57 0.21
Eye-Hand-Foot Coord. -0.14 0.44
Color Discrimination -0.28 0.46
The orthogonality assumption inherent to the method has the natural economic interpreta-
tion that these are truly different underlying skills: being good at one does not mechanically
imply being good at another. At the same time, there can certainly still be correlation in
abilities in the population of observed occupations. In fact, the correlation between observed
occupation scores on the first two components is -0.25: those with more cognitive ability
tend to be less able physically, and vice versa.
Covariates
We investigate how the results of the principle component analysis described in the previous
relate to the wage distribution. Figure 2.4 plots the first two components over population
skill percentiles. As one would expect, the cognitive component is of minor importance in
the lower end of the skill distribution, and starts to increase in importance somewhere below
the median. In contrast, the physical component is relatively flat for the lower half of the
distribution. Above the median it continuously declines with increasing skill level.
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Figure 2.4: Components over the Distribution
Taken together, the PCA results imply that the multi-dimensionality of human capital or
skills captured in the DOT can be summarized in two main factors, which we call cognitive
and manual. As expected, the physical skill is relatively more important in the lower half
of the wage distribution, while the cognitive becomes increasingly important for the higher
skilled occupations. We view this as an interesting result, as the skilled-versus-unskilled
dichotomy has a long tradition in the analysis of human capital.
Empirically, the skilled-versus-unskilled distinction has often been proxied for by years of
education or by comparing college educated workers to those without college education.
Figure 2.5 compares the PCA cognitive component to these traditional skill measures. It plots
the cognitive component alongside the average years of education and the share of college
graduates across wage percentiles in the population. All three measures behave very similarly
in a qualitative sense. They are systematically lower for the lower half of the distribution
and exhibit a break around the median. In the right half, all three measures are quickly
increasing. Table 2.2 presents correlations between these measures of education and the
two components, confirming the results from Figure 2.5: Education strongly correlates with
cognitive skills, but not with manual skills.
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that both manual and cognitive skills are impor-
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Figure 2.5: Components and Education
Table 2.2: Correlation between skill components and education measures
Correlations ‘Cognitive’ ‘Manual’
Years of Education 0.97 -0.83
College Share 0.98 -0.70
tant, manual skills predominate in occupations at the bottom of the income distribution
while cognitive skills predominate in the upper half. Furthermore, cognitive skills are highly
correlated with traditional measures of schooling, which suggests that the cognitive skill is
formed through education.
These observations have implications for the design of our theoretical framework. In particu-
lar, they suggest a model of skills where both manual and cognitive skills are important. This
is much in line with the literature on Skill-Biased Technological Change, however there is one
crucial difference: In the SBTC literature, it is commonly assumed that agents exclusively
supply one type of labor, skilled or unskilled. Empirically, the most common strategy for
mapping workers to skill types is by applying a cut-off for years of education above (below)
which workers are categorized as skilled (unskilled). In contrast, the PCA results presented
above suggest that both skills are continuous, i.e. workers in each occupation supply a bundle
of cognitive and manual skills, rather than just one of the two. This precludes the mapping
from years of schooling to skill categories. We will discuss the implications for our theoretical
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framework in the next Section. Importantly, skill continuity allows for heterogeneity that is
not given, but formed endogenously through schooling.
2.3 Model
In the remainder of the paper, we will theoretically and quantitatively explore how tax policy
changes distort skill accumulation incentives and thereby impact the shape of the earnings
distribution. Motivated by the empirical evidence presented in the previous Section, in this
Section we set up a general environment in which earnings are derived from multi-dimensional
skills. Individual skills are determined by innate ability and investment to different degrees.
We describe the individual income maximization problem trading off time in school and time
at work and discuss how progressive taxation distorts this trade-off.
2.3.1 Environment
Human capital accumulation A continuum of agents of mass one derives (pre-tax)
earnings from two skills, manual m and cognitive s, quantities of which are measured by
Hm and Hs, respectively. Human capital is accumulated by spending time in school at the
beginning of an agent’s life. Agents are active for one period of time, t ∈ [0, 1] and begin
their active period in school. They can leave at any time x ∈ [0, 1] to begin working.7
Individuals are endowed with cognitive and manual abilities α = (αs, αm). Ability α is
the only source of heterogeneity in the population. It is continuously distributed with pdf
f(α) over a finite and positive support [α, α¯]2. Based on the correlation between schooling
measures and the cognitive component discussed in Section 2.2, we assume that the manual
skill Hm is innate, i.e. it cannot be accumulated and depends only on manual ability αm.
In contrast, the cognitive skill Hs is subject to human capital accumulation or schooling.
The efficiency of schooling time depends on individual’s ability α, the amount of human
capital already accumulated and the time spent in school, according to a schooling function
s(Hs, α, t). Cognitive human capital Hs(α, x) > 0, is assumed to be a continuous and twice
differentiable function. Finally, we assume that ∂Hs(αs,x)
∂x
> 0: accumulated human capital is
a strictly positive function of time spent in school.
After quitting school, human capital stays constant for the remaining active time of the
agents. Human capital accumulation thus follows a differential equation
∂Hs
∂t
=
{
s(Hs, α, t), t ≤ x
0, t > x
(2.1)
7When we discuss the effects of policy changes in this model, we will essentially be comparing steady
states.
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and the amount of cognitive human capital while working is given by the level of human
capital at time x, Hs(α, x).
Multi-dimensional earnings Individuals are assumed to supply both of their skills to
the market simultaneously. Labor supply is assumed inelastic, and set to one. This implies
that each individual supplies Hm(α) units of manual labor and Hs(α, x) units of cognitive
labor when working. Instantaneous gross earnings y of an individual can now be described
as
y = wmHm(α) + wsHs(α, x). (2.2)
Here, wm and ws are wage rates for efficiency units of manual and cognitive skills, taken as
given by the agents.
On the production side of the economy, final output is produced by an aggregate production
function taking the total amounts of manual and cognitive skills in the economy as inputs,
Y = F (M,S).
Here, M and S are aggregate amounts of manual and cognitive skills in the economy and
given by
S =
∫ α
α
Hs(α, x)f(α) dα
and
M =
∫ α
α
Hm(α)f(α) dα = 1,
in light of the above normalization of manual skills. We assume competitive input markets,
thus wages wm and ws are given by their respective marginal products.
2.3.2 Individual Problem
Consumption prices are taken as the numeraire. Markets are complete, there are no sources
of uncertainty, and a single asset completes the market: agents can save and borrow asset a
without limit (except for repayment at t = 1) at the discount rate: r = r˜.8 Taxes are assumed
to be paid instantaneously over the rate of income y. This is a crucial model ingredient: in
reality, tax schedules are applied yearly, which is a short frequency compared to the length
of the life cycle. In our continuous time model, we capture this by applying the tax schedule
to the wage rate at any instance.
8We do not model the capital stock of the economy in general equilibrium, which yields the same results
as an economy that is ‘small’ and open to capital only, or with an aggregate production technology that is
linear in capital.
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An individual’s problem then looks as follows:
max
x∈[0,1],
{ct}t∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
e−r˜t
c1−σ
1− σdt (2.3)
subject to ∀t :
∂at
∂t
= −ct(1 + τc) + atr if t ≤ x,
∂at
∂t
= yt(1− τy(yt))− ct(1 + τc) + atr if t > x,
a0 = 0, a1 ≥ 0,
ct ≥ 0.
Agents decide on the duration of their education and on the life-cycle profile of consumption
and savings.
The government levies taxes on consumption and earnings, τc and τy(·), in order to meet
wasteful government spending target G. We assume that the earnings tax τy(·) is governed
by two parameters, responsible for average tax level φ and the degree of tax progressivity θ,
τy(·) = τy(· ;φ, θ).
2.4 Tax Policy, Inequality Changes and Polarization
In this Section, we study the effect of changes in the tax policy, in particular changes to
the tax progressivity θ on the shape of the earnings distribution. Investing in education
enables individuals to achieve higher earnings in a shorter time span. Recall that in our
framework, taxes are not applied to life-time income, but instead levied on instantaneous
earnings, in order to resemble real-world income taxation. For a given life-time income,
positive tax progressivity punishes higher per-period earnings relative to an earnings profile
that spreads out lower earnings over a larger fraction of the life-cycle. Through this channel,
tax progressivity directly influences the optimal choice of time in school, x∗ and cognitive
human capital, Hs(α, x∗). Next, we will present a static version of the general framework
above. We will then define the notions of inequality and polarization in this framework and
provide conditions for the latter to arise in response to a policy change.
2.4.1 A simple static framework
Life-cycle problem (2.3) above has a straightforward solution. Since individuals can only
decide between going to school or working full-time, the amount of human capital is fully
determined by the time spent in school, x, and cognitive ability, αs. Second, because markets
are complete, agents smooth consumption and the choice of the optimal x is unconstrained.
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As there are no other choices in the model, the agent now simply maximizes lifetime after-tax
income with respect to time in school:
max
x≥0
(1− x)y(1− τ(y;φ, θ)) (2.4)
subject to:
y = wm + wsHs(α, x).
For tractability, we assume that there is no heterogeneity in the manual skill, so that we can
normalize its level to one, Hm = 1. This implies that the aggregate amount of manual skill,
M is also equal to one.
In the following, we will be interested in how changes in the tax progressivity θ shape the
income distribution in this environment. As discussed, the optimal schooling decision will be
directly governed by the degree of tax progressivity. From now on, we will therefore directly
work with h(α, θ) ≡ Hs(α, x∗) instead of human capital Hs(α, x), where x∗ is the argmax of
individual income maximization problem (2.4).
2.4.2 Policy changes and earnings distribution
Our basic interest is the study of the effect of taxation on the earnings distribution in the
presence of multi-dimensional skills. To this end, we will formalize the notion of earnings
inequality and earnings polarization in our framework and provide conditions for either of
them to arise. As will become clear below, earnings polarization is a special case of earnings
inequality growth, with additional restrictions on the relative movements of earnings within
the lower tail of the distribution.
As outlined above, we will link the changes in the earnings distribution reported by Autor
and Dorn (2013) to changes in the tax incentives to relative skill supply studied by Guvenen
et al. (2014). Thus, we will be interested in the relative (percentage change) effects of policy
on earnings, since this is the theoretical equivalent of Figure 2.2. In particular, we will then be
interested in how these policy effects differ across different parts of the income distribution.
Our general object of interest is therefore given by
∂y
∂θ
y
.
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It turns out, this can be easily decomposed into separate parts as follows:(
∂y
∂θ
)
y
=
(
∂
(
y
ws
)
∂θ
)
(
y
ws
) +
(
∂ws
∂θ
)
ws
=
(
∂
(
wm
ws
)
∂θ
)
+ ∂h
∂θ(
wm
ws
)
+ h
+
(
∂ws
∂θ
)
ws
≡ w
′
θ
(w + h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
+
h′θ
(w + h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantity effect
+
ws
′
θ
ws︸︷︷︸
level effect
(2.5)
In the above, percentage changes in income have been separated into three terms. The first
two terms describe the potential trade-off policy created in a multi-dimensional model: on
the one hand, policies can increase (or decrease) incentives to acquire human capital, which
we call a quantity effect, but when they do so for all individuals this increases (decreases)
the overall supply of learnable skills in the economy, which can decrease (increase) their
relative price - a price effect. Both these terms would then move in the same direction, but
their relative importance and strength depends on an individual’s schooling responsiveness
to policy. This responsiveness will in principle depend on the level of the ability parameter α,
generating potentially non-linear effects of policy changes on income changes. The last term
above affects all individuals equally in percentage terms. It arises because wage effects are
described in skill premium terms, but a policy reform can also impact the overall productivity
level in an economy - hence the name level effect.
Polarization in this environment arises if relative income changes in response to a policy
change are stronger in the tails of the income distribution than in the center of the dis-
tribution. Since in the model, income is entirely determined by ability, this is equivalent
to comparing income responses for different ability levels. Formally, inequality growth and
polarization in response to tax policy changes can be defined in terms of relative income
changes as follows.
Definition 2. Inequality Change and Polarization. Inequality change exists in response to a
policy change in θ if for α and α the following inequality holds:(
∂y
∂θ
)
y
∣∣∣∣∣
α=α
<
(
∂y
∂θ
)
y
∣∣∣∣∣
α=α
< 0. (2.6)
Polarization exists if in addition to equation (2.6), for some αˆ ∈ (α, α) the following holds
as well: (
∂y
∂θ
)
y
∣∣∣∣∣
α=α
<
(
∂y
∂θ
)
y
∣∣∣∣∣
α=αˆ
< 0. (2.7)
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Definition 2 restates income inequality growth and polarization in response to a decline in
tax progressivity θ in concise terms. First, the inequality aspect, i.e. high income individuals
pulling away even further from the rest of the population, requires a stronger relative income
response to a policy change for high ability individuals than low ability individuals. Since
this effect is negative for higher levels of tax progressivity θ, the response will be more
negative for high ability individuals. Second, the non-monotonicity in the lower tail of the
income distribution distinguishes polarization from general trends in overall inequality: low-
income individuals are able to partially catch-up to medium income individuals, while overall
inequality still increases.
2.4.3 Conditions for Inequality Growth and Polarization
Our reformulation of the life-cycle problem (2.3) as income maximization problem (2.4)
allows us to establish conditions for polarization to arise in our framework. After presenting
those conditions, we will show their sufficiency for polarization to arise. The intuition for
this result can also be seen from reformulating the decomposition (2.5) in terms of tax policy
elasticities as follows:
εyθ = ε
w
θ
w
w + h(α)
+ εhθ (α)
h(α)
w + h(α)
+ εLEθ . (2.8)
Equation (2.8) rewrites the total relative earnings elasticity in terms of weighted elasticities
of the price and the quantity effect, both of which are functions of α and the level effect
,which is independent of α. Polarization can arise because the elasticity of the price effect has
the same size for all abilities, while the elasticity of the quantity effect potentially grows in
α. In addition, the weights also change in ability, since for higher ability the share of income
generated from cognitive human capital increases. Depending on the shape of the change of
elasticity of the quantity effect, we can have non-monotone changes in relative income across
abilities. In particular, if εhθ (α) is small in absolute magnitude for small and medium α, the
growing weight on the second, quantity elasticity term may initially decrease the absolute
magnitude of overall elasticity as we move along the earnings distribution. Only once εhθ (α)
is large enough in absolute magnitude will the absolute magnitude of the overall elasticity
begin to grow in earnings.
In the following, we will make this reasoning more precise by first laying out the assumptions
sufficient for polarization to arise, and then go through the precise mechanism. The main
purpose of this exercise is to clarify and formalize the intuition just laid out.
Definition 3. Define αˆ ∈ (α, α) as any α that generates a local extremum in the tax elasticity
of income,
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=αˆ
= 0.
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Inequality change and polarization in Definition 2 were defined for an arbitrary interior αˆ.
Definition 3 restricts, as we will see below, the interior αˆ to the ability level that under the
below assumptions minimizes (in absolute terms) the income elasticity εyθ(α).
Assumption 1. Shape of the human capital elasticity. Human capital elasticity εhθ (α) be-
haves relative to the relative wage elasticity εwθ as follows for different ability levels:
- The human capital quantity elasticity is increasing and convex in ability level α in
absolute terms,
∂εhθ (α)
∂α
< 0 and
∂2εhθ (α)
∂α2
< 0, and at the lower bound approximately zero:
∂εhθ (α)
∂α
≈ 0.
- For abilities α ≤ αˆ, the human capital elasticity is lower in absolute terms than the
elasticity of relative prices, εhθ (α)− εwθ > 0.
- For high ability individuals, the human capital elasticity is higher in absolute terms
than the elasticity of relative prices, εhθ (α)− εwθ < 0.
Assumption 1 states that for low ability individuals, the relative price elasticity is stronger
than the quantity elasticity. The quantity elasticity is increasingly growing in ability and for
abilities high enough, it becomes larger than the relative price elasticity in absolute terms.
Assumption 2. Human capital function. Human capital accumulation is strictly convex and
positive in α, h′α, h
′′
α > 0. In addition, for all α ∈ [α, α], the following restriction on the shape
of the optimal human capital quantities holds:
1
w + h
<
2(h′α)
2
h′′αα
.
Recall from above that h(α, θ) is the cognitive human capital resulting from the optimal
schooling decision of the agent, h(α, θ) ≡ Hs(α, x∗). Therefore, Assumption 2 effectively
imposes restrictions shape of the schooling technology. In particular, it is required that the
human capital is convex in ability, but cannot increase too quickly – h′′α has to be sufficiently
small.
Result 1. Given Assumption 1, inequality changes as defined in Definition 2 occur in re-
sponse to a change in tax policy θ. If in addition Assumption 2 also holds, polarization as
defined in Definition 2 occurs as well.
Proof: For the inequality change part, we will show that income elasticity εyθ(α) is larger
in absolute terms for α than for α. For the polarization part, we will show that under
Assumption 2, there is a unique αˆ as defined in Definition 3 and this αˆ is the argmax of the
maximum of εyθ(α) (minimum in absolute terms).
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Inequality change: To show that 0 > εyθ(α) > ε
y
θ(α), we will first show that ε
y
θ(α)− εLEθ > εwθ
and second that εyθ(α)− εLEθ < εwθ . To show the former, consider
εyθ(α)− εLEθ > εwθ
⇔ εwθ
w
w + h(α)
+ εhθ (α)
h(α)
w + h(α)
> εwθ
⇔ εwθ
w
w + h(α)
+ εhθ (α)
h(α)
w + h(α)
> εwθ
w
w + h(α)
+ εwθ
h(α)
w + h(α)
⇔ εhθ (α) > εwθ ,
where the last inequality holds by Assumption 1. For the high ability case εyθ(α)− εLEθ < εwθ ,
a similar argument holds. Together, this implies that εyθ(α) − εLEθ > εwθ > εyθ(α) − εLEθ .
εyθ(α) > ε
y
θ(α) is implied by the last inequalities, establishing inequality change as defined in
equation (2.6) from Definition 2.
Polarization: To show that the unique global maximum of εyθ(α) is at αˆ, we show first that
αˆ is the only extremum, and second that the first derivative is strictly larger (smaller) than
zero for all α smaller (larger) than αˆ. The first derivative of εyθ(α) with respect to α is given
by
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
=
(
εhθ (α)− εwθ
) wh′α
(w + h)2
+
∂εhθ (α)
∂α
h
w + h
. (2.9)
Therefore,
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
> (<) 0 boils down to
(
εhθ (α)− εwθ
) wh′α
(w + h)2
> (<) − ∂ε
h
θ (α)
∂α
h
w + h
.
For the left-hand side, Assumption 1 implies that
(
εhθ (α) − εwθ
)
is strictly declining in α,
positive for α and negative for α. Define α˜ as the α such that εhθ (α˜)− εwθ = 0. Note that by
Assumption 1 α > α˜ > αˆ holds. Assumption 2 implies that wh
′
α
(w+h)2
is strictly decreasing in α
and strictly positive. Together this implies that the left-hand side is strictly declining in α
for α < α˜, positive for α < α˜ and negative for α > α˜. For the right-hand side, Assumption
1 implies that −∂εhθ (α)
∂α
is ≈ 0 for α and strictly increasing and positive for all α > α.
Taken together, this implies that
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
> 0 and
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
< 0. Furthermore, since the left-
hand side is strictly declining while positive and the right-hand side strictly increasing and
positive, there exists exactly one α for which
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
= 0. This proves the existence of a unique
αˆ as defined in Definition 3. Since for all α < αˆ, we have that
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
> 0 and for all α > αˆ, we
have that
∂εyθ(α)
∂α
< 0, αˆ is a global maximum. Since αˆ ∈ (α, α), this establishes polarization
as defined in equation (2.7).
The aim of this Section has been to detail conditions on the price and quantity effects
for earnings polarization to arise in our framework with two types of skills and general
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equilibrium price effects. We show that depending on the shape of the elasticities, polarization
can arise in our framework of two-dimensional skills and general equilibrium skill price effects.
In the following, we will first present some reduced-form cross-country evidence for our
mechanism in the next Section, and then try to quantify the economic importance of this
supply-side channel in a richer version of our model in Section 2.6.
2.5 Models versus Data
2.5.1 Across Countries
Tax systems differ in progressivity across countries (Figure 2.6). Our model makes clear
predictions on the role of progressivity in income inequality: more progressive tax systems
produce less inequality as measured by relative earnings in the income distribution. This
is driven by changes in the upper half of the income distribution, while inequality in the
bottom half varies little with tax progressivity. Neither prediction is made by a model with
one-dimensional skills, nested in our setup.9 We now investigate these predictions in cross-
country data, for which we need measures of tax progressivity and relative earnings inequality.
Coen-Pirani (2017) sets forth a method to obtain measures of tax progressivity from OECD
data, which works as follows: If we assume that both gross and net earnings are log-normally
distributed and that taxes follow the functional form assumed above, measured Gini coeffi-
cients of gross and net earnings can be used to back out an estimate of θ. A panel data set
of Gini coefficients is available from the OECD Income Distribution Database. We use data
on the working age population (ages 18 to 65), using the income definition that the OECD
followed until 2011 for better availability and comparability of data. Data are available for
about 30 OECD member countries, covering a period from the mid 1970s to 2015. Coverage
is thin for earlier years, but improves towards the end of the sample. Because the panel
is rather unbalanced, we average the resulting measures of tax progressivity for the years
2010–2015, and use this as a cross-section of country-level tax progressivity.
Also available from the OECD is an unbalanced panel of relative earnings inequality measures
across countries and over time. The underlying population are full-time employees of either
gender. These include the earnings ratio of the 90th percentile cut-off to the 50th percentile
cut-off, or 90-50 ratio, and the same for the 50th and 10th percentile, the 50-10 ratio. While
these two measures describe relative inequality above and below the median, the resulting
90-10 ratio measures inequality. We choose to use these measures because their movement
9We think of tax systems as exogenous to the remainder of the economy. If tax progressivity is in some
way a response to higher earnings inequality, this would counteract our mechanism and make it harder to
find a correspondence between theory and data.
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has a close correspondence to what we consider in our theoretical exposition: if relative
(percentage) changes are the same across the distribution, then these measures will remain
unchanged with tax progressivity. We again average over the years 2010–2015. The overlap
between the two datasets consists of 32 countries.
Next, we estimate the (linear) impact of tax progressivity on earnings inequality at different
points in the distribution. Results of OLS regressions of the latter on the former are dis-
played in Table 2.3. Figure 2.6 presents the results graphically. Tax progressivity is generally
associated with a reduced relative earnings inequality. For the 90-10 ratio, the slope is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. For the 90-50 ratio the slope is statistically significant
at the 1% level. For the 50-10 ratio, the slope is not statistically significant, even at the 10%
level. While tax progressivity has quite some explanatory power in the upper half of the
distribution, as measured by the R2, this is not true for the lower half of the distribution.
Table 2.3: Regression results
Inequality measure
90-10 ratio 90-50 ratio 50-10 ratio
Progressivity φ1 -1.17 -1.92 -0.19
(0.54) (0.59) (0.41)
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32 32 32
R2 0.14 0.26 0.01
Figure 2.6: Tax progressivity and Inequality across Countries
All these results align very well with our model prediction, even as we are looking at simple
linear relations. In a more extensive quantitative exercise, Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan
(2014) analyze the responses of a one-dimensional model of human capital to changes in tax
progressivity. Their model has several added features, such as flexible labor supply, and a
more flexible functional form for average tax rates. While they show that their model does
well in accounting for 90-10 ratios, it is less succesful in disentangling 50-10 ratios. Our
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analysis suggests that this is due to the multi-dimensional nature of skills, which is most
relevant to the bottom half of the distribution. It also suggests that the productivity effect
of taxes on human capital may be mitigated by general equilibrium effects.
2.5.2 Over Time
Tax progressivity in the United States has declined dramatically since the 1970s (Figure
2.1). That same observation applies to many other countries (Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan,
2014). What implications would this have had for other observables, in particular changes to
the shape of the earnings distribution? The literature review above already shows that the
earnings distribution is shaped by a number of different forces. That fact significantly limits
the extent to which we can verify the direct impact of tax changes on inequality through our
mechanism empirically. Nevertheless, we attempt to provide a qualitative discussion.
Educational decisions are decisions for the long run. Agents expectations of future policies are
therefore key to the empirical mechanism we describe, and observed transitions may be slow.
In any case, one would expect that younger cohorts react more strongly to incentives than
older ones, so that empirically it should be the younger cohorts that cause polarization. This
is indeed what the empirical literature finds. Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu (2017) document
that the fall in what they call ‘routine’ occupations in the middle of the distribution can be
largely attributed to two groups: young and prime-aged men with low levels of education
where it comes to ‘routine manual’ occupations, and young and prime-aged women with
intermediate levels of education where it comes to ‘routine cognitive’ occupations. In terms
of age structure, this lines up well with the implications of our mechanism. While our model
does not speak to gender per se, the gender differences these authors highlight underline
our main suggestion for further research: changes in labor market discrimination may be
important. We will come back to this in more detail in the concluding Section 2.7.
Implications of changes in tax incentives for wages are summarized by rising inequality, in
gross wages and even more so net of taxes, and polarization. While these phenomena can
also be observed in the data, their underlying components cannot. This is because observed
wages are the product of human capital quantities and prices. Did wage inequality grow due
to greater differences in human capital or due to rising prices for the highly skilled? Our
mechanism would suggest the former. The theory of Skill-Biased Technological Change on
the other hand takes growth of educational attainment at face value as a measure of human
capital quantities, and interprets its slow-down as a reason for rising prices for the highly
skilled.
Separating human capital quantities from their price is a central empirical challenge in the
labor literature and existing evidence is scarce. One approach is to identify an age in the
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life-cycle at which human capital is unlikely to change much, and attribute wage changes at
that age to changes in the price of human capital. This is the approach followed by Bowlus
and Robinson (2012). These authors do not find large changes in prices at all, attributing
changes in the wages of different educational groups to changes in human capital. This would
be more in line with our mechanism than for example SBTC, although to cause polarization
on its own our general equilibrium effect would require a growing relative price of manual
versus cognitive skills. Price estimates by such skill types are unfortunately unavailable.
Similar caveats apply to direct measures of human capital (such as schooling attainment),
measured skill premia, and before and after tax returns to schooling. While our model makes
predictions for each of these, it is not clear what is the relevant empirical counterpart. A
number of possible comparisons are further complicated by the fact that our model is not a
growth model, so that it cannot account for longer-run trends in these data.
Finally we return to our initial comment: our mechanism is unlikely to have been the only
relevant change during the period. Other explanations focus on secular technological devel-
opments that have shaped the wage distribution through changes in labor demand. These
explanations are complementary to ours as long as relative prices of skills move in the same
direction as in our model. That holds for the literature that describes how middling ‘routine’
occupations are more prone to automation. The same applies to papers that explain the
growth of service occupations at the bottom of the distribution through changes in demand.
SBTC fits our model less well, since it starts with the assumption that it is prices of human
capital that have caused inequality to grow. Future research will hopefully shed further light
on this debate.
After having discussed evidence for some general predictions of our framework, next we will
present a quantitative version and subsequently use it for a more formal investigation of the
quantitative relevance of our mechanism.
2.6 An Enriched Model
In this Section, we extend our model to include heterogeneity in manual (non-learnable) skills
and choose some functional forms. We then parameterize our model to reproduce several key
stylized facts of the US economy, and use it to evaluate counter-factual policies.
2.6.1 Model Description
A continuum of agents, whose total mass equals one, live for t ∈ [0, 1], first goes to school
until t = x and then works. When in school (x ≤ t), individuals build learnable human
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capital according to the following law of motion:
∂hs,t
∂t
= βtβ−1αshs,t. (2.10)
Thereafter, ∂hs,t
∂t
= 0. This function resembles more conventional human capital functions
such as the one due to Ben-Porath (1967), but the time-in-school structure keeps the model
computationally simple. Time in school is more productive for the more able and educated,
but diminishes over time. hs,0 is assumed linear in αs, so that the two are perfectly correlated.
This simplifies the problem significantly at little cost. Non-learnable human capital is given
by hm,t = hm,0 = αm. Both skills are assumed to be independently drawn from normal
distributions (winsorized at three standard deviations from the mean), resulting in a tuple
(αm, αs) for each individual. When working (x > t), individuals derive income from both
types of human capital:
yt = wmhm,t + wshs,t. (2.11)
From here on out, the individual problem is the same as in equation 2.3 above. We consider
overlapping generations such that the population distribution is always in steady state.
Let the distribution of type tuples (αm, αs) ∈ A be denoted by λ. Define human capital
aggregates as follows (where I[·] is an indicator function):
Hm =
∫ 1
0
∫
A
hm,tI[t>x] dλ dt (2.12)
Hs =
∫ 1
0
∫
A
hs,tI[t>x] dλ dt. (2.13)
Aggregate production takes place using the following production function:
Y = F (Hm, Hs) = A
[
γHρm + (1− γ)Hρs
] 1
ρ
. (2.14)
The elasticity of substitution between the two inputs is given by 1
1−ρ , and γ is a share
parameter. We normalize output so that A = 1.
A government sets taxes τc and τn(·). Its budget is balanced by expenditures G that are
assumed not to influence any of the above:∫ 1
0
∫
A
ctτc + ytτn(yt)I[t>x] dλ dt = G. (2.15)
Definition 4. An equilibrium of the model is defined as:
Wages wm, ws,
allocations Hm, Hs,
government spending G,
decision rules for x, {ct}t∈[0,1] ∀ (αm, αs) ∈ A
such that given the parameters of the model the following holds:
91
- individual decision rules solve problem 2.3
- goods markets clear:
Y =
∫ 1
0
∫
A
ct dλ dt (2.16)
- labor markets clear (equations 2.12 and 2.13)
- wages equal marginal products (of equation 2.14)
- and the government budget constraint is balanced (equation 2.15).
2.6.2 Parameterization
Equilibria of the economy are found numerically. Parameters are set to match moments of
the data in the early 2000s. In doing so, the following parameterizations of initial abilities
and human capital stocks is used. Let α˜s denote a standard normal distribution, winsorized
at three standard deviations.
αs = µs + σsα˜s, (2.17)
hs,0 = 1 + (α˜s − α˜s)ψs. (2.18)
αs is the lowest level of αs. The lowest level of hs,0 is normalized to 1, while average learning
ability, the spread in learning ability, and the spread in initial learnable human capital is
controlled by parameters. Likewise,
hm,0 = 1 + (αm − αm)ψm, (2.19)
where αm is standard normal and ψm controls the spread of initial non-learnable human
capital.
Table 2.4: Parameters and moments
Parameter Value Moment Model Data
σ 2.857 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.350 0.350
ψm 0.141 Earnings variance at start of working life versus overall 0.528 0.500
ψs 28.068 Gini coefficient of gross earnings 0.346 0.440
µs 0.947 Average share of working age spent in school 0.030 0.034
σs 0.225 Variance of share in school 0.002 0.002
β 0.858 Share with zero education after age 18 0.478 0.456
ρ 0.286 Elasticity of substitution in production 1.400 1.400
γ 0.519 Non-learnable share of output 0.248 0.250
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Table 2.4 reports data moments. Some of our model parameters are straightforwardly in-
formed by moments of the data, while for others much less clear-cut measures are available.
We use the midpoint of the range of elasticities of intertemporal substitution reported in
Havranek (2013) to set the same in the model (σ), but that parameter does not influence
any of the results we report. The spread of both initial human capitals is important for
overall earnings variation, and their relative size helps determine the extent to which that
variation is present at age 0. Thus, we target the Gini coefficient of gross earnings as reported
by the OECD for the year 2000. We also target a ratio of earnings variance at age 0 versus
earnings variance overall of 1/2. While we do not have a precise estimate for this number
from the data, research using the life-cycle of earnings Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011)
suggests about two thirds of earnings are pinned down after tertiary education. Finally, to
determine the average and spread of ability, we target the share of a potential 48 years of
working life from age 18 that is spent in school (i.e. college and beyond), the variance of
these shares, and the share of pupils who do not spend any time in college. We calculate
the data moments from the 2000 Census sample described in the above, where all education
beyond 12th grade is counted as taking place during the adult life cycle.
Finally, the parameters in the production function are key to size general equilibrium re-
sponses. Unfortunately, no reduced form results on general equilibrium effects between skills
as we describe them are available. Instead, we rely on evidence on general equilibrium effects
between college educated and non-college educated labor. Here, a large body of evidence
suggests an elasticity of substitution of about 1.4 (see for example Katz and Murphy (1992)
and Ciccone and Peri (2005)). Because these two groups would both use either type of human
capital, we take the view that this is a very conservative estimate of the two elasticity of
substitution that is relevant to our model. To tie down the share parameter of the production
technology, we target the share of non-learnable human capital in output. Again, no direct
evidence is available, so that we tentatively set this target to 25%.
Consumption taxes are set to 7.5%, following the 2003 Figure reported in McDaniel (2007).
We estimate the tax function used in the above from tax rates at different levels of average
US earnings for 2003, and then do the same for 1983, following Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan
(2014) (we use the same data as those authors). This results in an estimate φ1 = 0.119 for
2003, which is used for parameterizing the model, and an estimate of φ1 = 0.188 for 1983,
which we use in our counter-factual analysis below. φ0 is set to clear the government’s budget
constraint.
Table 2.4 also demonstrates the model’s ability to match the data. Overall, model moments
are close to data moments, although the model does struggle to create sufficient earnings
heterogeneity to match the economy’s inequality levels.
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2.6.3 Results
To analyze the results of tax progressivity, we compare the steady state earnings distribution
of the 1983 estimate of φ1 to the steady state distribution with the 2003 estimate. We think
of this as a counter-factual reform in which tax progressivity was reduced. The procedure
yields a reform that is per definition realistic, both in shape and magnitude. We would not
want to argue that our results are empirical in the sense that they have bearing on the change
in the period. (For that to be the case, one would want to consider other factors, as well as
the transition from one steady state to another.) Rather, we are looking for a counter-factual
experiment that gives us a feeling for the effect sizes in our model.
We then turn to measures of inequality. Indeed, reducing the progressivity parameter has
increased the 90-10 ratio about one-for-one, which is what we also find in our cross-country
analysis. This increase can be almost entirely attributed to the upper half of the distribution
i.e. the 90-50 ratio. Again, this is entirely in line with our cross-country findings. These
results give us confidence that the model adequately captures the reaction of the earnings
distribution to tax progressivity.
Figure 2.7a shows the results graphically (labeled ‘baseline’). It is apparent that some po-
larization occurs, but little: the bottom wages grow a few tenths of percent more than those
with the lowest wage growth. The top grows by almost 7% more than the lowest point.10 To
bear out polarization given the large increase in inequality in the top half, we show the same
graph but restricted to the lower half of percentiles in Figure 2.7b.
There are a number of reasons why one might consider the effect sizes we present conservative.
First, the elasticity of substitution between the two skill types may be smaller in practice,
leading to larger price effects: the elasticity has been measured in the previous literature
using data on college versus non-college educated labor. However, that categorization is a
noisy measure of the underlying skills that our theory predicts is relevant. This would lead
to an overestimation of the elasticity in a typical regression methodology (e.g. in that of
Katz and Murphy (1992)) due to attenuation bias, reducing the price effect (which goes to
zero as the elasticity goes to infinity). Second, we have not included leisure, which works
as an amplifying mechanism (cf. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014)). Third, our view of
human capital is a very limited one, because we only focus on time in formal schooling. The
same incentives would however also affect learning during the life-cycle, making the overall
impact much larger. In addition, in this paper we are focusing on the part of the labor
wedge originating exclusively from income taxation. There exist other sources for the labor
10For those interested, we report that this is 6% and 45%, respectively, of the equivalent empirical change
in the period. As already noted, we do not want to encourage such empirical interpretations too much.
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Figure 2.7: Relative earnings change under counter-factual reform
(a) Full distribution
(b) Lower half of the distribution
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wedge, in particular discrimination. Since this is outside the current model, we will postpone
a detailed discussion of this to the concluding Section 2.7. Finally, potentially also the share
of output the model attributes to manual skills, γ, is driving out results. However, we know
little about it’s empirical counterpart - this becomes a suggestion for further research. To
investigate the importance of the manual skills share for our results, in the next subsection
we will conduct a formal sensitivity analysis of the respective parameter, γ. As will become
clear, sensitivity is relatively small. This is reassuring, as it implies that our results are
relatively robust to changes in γ.
2.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The main moment of which we are uncertain is the one informing γ, the share of output that
is contributed by non-learnable skills. At the same time, this parameter is obviously crucial
in assessing the importance of our mechanism: in the absence of non-learnable skills output,
the model collapses to a uniform human capital model. To make this clear, we re-calibrate
the model setting the moment for γ to zero, which results in γ = 0 (and slight changes
to some of the other parameters). Figures 2.7a and 2.7b also show the results in this case
(labeled ‘one-dimensional’). While the result is similar for overall inequality, polarization has
disappeared. The effect on inequality within the bottom half of the population is now much
more straight-forward.11
We provide a more formal analysis of the sensitivity of γ in the remainder of this Section.
Our parameters can be interpreted as estimates of an indirect inference procedure: They are
the result of minimizing the distance between the data moments described in Table 2.4, the
vector of which we will now call sˆ, and the model moments that we will call s(θ) (where θ is
the vector of parameters). Defining gˆ = sˆ− s(θ), we then used θ to minimize gˆ′Igˆ (where I
is the identity matrix that we use as weights) and reported the argmin θˆ of our problem in
Table 2.4.
Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) establish a methodology for measuring the sensi-
tivity of parameter estimates to estimation moments. They suggest reporting an estimate of
the matrix Λ = −(G′WG)−1G′W , where G is the Jacobian of the probability limit of gˆ at
the true parameter values θ0, and W is the weighing matrix (the identity matrix in our case).
The advantage of their method is that it is computationally simple to find a point estimate of
G, and therefore Λ: because our objective vector gˆ is additive and only s(θ) depends on the
parameters, we can simply calculate the numeric Jacobian matrix S of our model moments
11The ‘one-dimensional’ graph in Figure 2.7b appears to display a kink that is not actually there: invest-
ment in education is always non-zero due to an Inada condition in human capital formation. The visual effect
arises because levels of the human capital distribution have been compressed to a percentile scale.
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s(θ) at the estimated parameter value θˆ. In short, we have that our sensitivity estimate is
given by Λ = S−1.
How should these sensitivity estimates be interpreted? Entry λij of Λ tells us, roughly, how
large the local impact of a change in data moment j is on parameter i. It can be used
to calculate the asymptotic bias in our estimates associated with an alternative hypothesis
on the data moments, as long as the alternative is sufficiently close to the data moments
we report. More straightforwardly, it can be used to verbally discuss the sensitivity of our
estimates to the data moments. That is a particularly appealing feature in light of the
uncertainty around some of the data moments that we report above. Because a unit change
in the data moments is not always easy to interpret, we instead opt to report results relevant
to a 1% change of each data moment. This is achieved by multiplying λij by a percent of
data moment j. The results are in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Sensitivity Analysis
Moment nr. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
σ -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ψm 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.51 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
ψs 0.00 50.95 335.41 -566.61 1901.24 -23.21 -2.41 129.65
µs 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.29 4.45 0.01 0.00 0.02
σs 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.19 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
β 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.01
ρ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
γ 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.02
Note: Model moments are 1 – Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution,
2 – Earnings variance at start of working life versus overall, 3 – Gini
coefficient of gross earnings, 4 – Average share of working age spent in
school, 5 – Variance of share in school, 6 – Share with zero education
after age 18, 7 – Elasticity of substitution in production, 8 – Manual
human capital share of output. See also Table 2.4.
Two parameters, σ and ρ, are only sensitive to the one moment on which they depend by a
closed-form relation (the latter’s sensitivity measure is zero in the table due to round-off).
ψs takes on larger values, and so is generally more responsive in level terms. ψm and ψs
react most heavily to moments that describe the distribution of earnings and schooling. As
we would hope, parameters describing learning ability and the formation of human capital
indeed react most strongly to those moments that describe the distribution of schooling.
The parameter γ reacts strongly to the 5th moment, the variance of schooling, which clearly
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plays an important role in the determination of the model’s parameters.
As discussed above, we have very little information about the ‘non-learnable share of output’,
γ, which is the eighth and last data moment in Table 2.5 above. It turns out that this
parameter does play some role in the determination of γ, albeit not a large one. That there
is some sensitivity is quite in line with our expectation, given the analysis included above
where we set γ = 0. The fact that the sensitivity is not extremely large is reassuring, since
it implies that our results would relatively little if our target of γ was somewhat off. We
remain with the conclusion that the importance of manual skills in the overall economy is an
important determinant of the strength of our mechanism, but that we unfortunately know
little about it.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effect of tax incentives on cognitive skills, in a model where
(learnable) cognitive and (non-learnable) manual skills jointly produce earnings. It has also
attempted to argue why this is a relevant view of the labor market, combining general
equilibrium elements from the literature on skill-biased technological change and incentive
elements from the literature on human capital formation. In doing so, it has provided an
alternative mechanism through which labor market polarization may arise.
In the paper we focus exclusively on the part of the labor wedge originating from taxation.
An important additional source of the labor wedge originates from discrimination. Over the
second half of the 20th century (labor market) discrimination against women and non-white
groups arguably decreased a lot. There is growing evidence that the decline in discrimination
has been quantitatively important for US macroeconomic outcomes. Dwyer (2013) provides
evidence that polarization in employment has been driven to a substantial part by women
increasingly entering the labor market, primarily in the tails of the distribution. Hsieh et al.
(2016) estimate that about 25% of US output per capita growth between 1960 and 2010 can
be attributed to an improved allocation of talent due declines in discrimination in the labor
market and in access to education. Decreasing the price of education for a substantial share
of the working population would have a similar effect as the decline in tax progressivity, by
increasing the relative payoff of spending time in school. Similarly, if declines in discrimi-
nation take place in the form of ’breaking the glass ceiling’, they might over-proportionally
improve labor market outcomes for high-earning women, again resembling declines in tax
progressivity. Potentially, these results therefore imply that the decline of progressivity of
the effective labor wedge has been a lot larger than the decline in the explicit tax wedge. In
this case, our results present a definitive lower bound on the supply-side polarization channel
discussed here.
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Future research may lead in a number of directions. First, fundamental questions on our
model of the labor market remain of interest. For example, credibly exogenous variation in
skill levels might illuminate the prices paid for different levels (or bundles) of skills. Second,
further research into the distributional effects of reduced discrimination against minority
groups in the labor market seems warranted. Finally, while the emphasis in this paper has
been on positive implications, one might ask what optimal tax and education policies look
like in a model like ours. In the presence of general equilibrium effects, tax disincentives
to the formation of human capital are more harmful than is traditionally assumed, likely
warranting less progressive tax schedules.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 PCA Results
The table below displays the full PCA results. Each column represents the correlation be-
tween a component and the original variables. The table begins with the component that
explains the largest share of variance, then the second largest, and so forth.
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Chapter 3
Economics PhD Programs in Europe:
Completion Times and More
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing convergence of economics PhD programs in Europe to-
wards their US counterparts. Increasingly, a number of European programs offer structured
programs that include a significant coursework component, and are able to provide funding
for the entire program length. While this convergence has been noted, little structured in-
formation is available on these European programs. We take a first step towards filling this
gap.
Using a unique hand-collected dataset, we add to results by Stock et al. (2009) and Stock
and Siegfried (2014) on completion times in US graduate programs in economics. We find
that their conclusions on completion time hold in European structured graduate programs as
well. In the past 5 years, median completion times have been rising steadily, and the median
is now approaching 6 years. We also provide some qualitative description of the differences
between European programs and their US counterparts, in particular with regards to program
structure and funding.1 Because our analysis focuses on subset of all European programs,
with emphasis on including good programs that resemble top US programs in structure, our
results should not be taken as representative of European economics PhD education more
1This project started as an internal project at the European University Institute (EUI), where we tried
to understand the differences between the EUI Economics Doctoral Program and its closest competitors, in
particular with regards to completion time. While such information was readily available for US programs,
we had to hand-collect information on European programs by going through the CVs of over 700 recent job
market candidates. Subsequently, we realized that our findings could benefit the economics community at
large, and therefore merit wider dissemination.
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broadly.
Our analysis focuses on job market candidates. These are the students that compete on the
international academic job market for economics graduates.2 We believe this to be the policy-
relevant subsample for three reasons. First, delivering internationally competitive candidates
is the stated goal of many European economics PhD programs. That job market is the highest
international standard for young researchers in economics. Second, this measure ensures that
the students we consider are at the same stage of their career as their US counterparts. Third,
over the last years, the international job market has become an important recruiting device
for economics PhD graduates outside the narrowly defined academic sector. Increasingly,
international organizations, such as central banks, governments and also the private sector
are hiring through the economics job market.
The paper also investigates how completion time and initial placement quality vary with
personal researcher characteristics. For each candidate in the sample, we collect data on
gender, field, field of undergraduate studies and their initial placement. Candidates who
go on the market in the sixth year of their PhD have a significantly higher probability
of top ranked initial placements. We find field and gender do not significantly correlate
with completion time nor with placement quality. We do find however, that the probability
of placing in a top ranked institution is significantly lower for economics PhD candidates
trained in social sciences, compared to candidates trained in economics, finance, business,
engineering or natural sciences. We interpret this finding as evidence for the importance of
formal mathematical training for the successful completion of an economics PhD.
3.2 Economics PhD Programs in Europe
Selection of Programs We established a list of top European programs from a variety
of sources. In particular, we emphasized that they should have international recruiting and
placement, as well as a structured graduate program (including coursework), which makes
them comparable to top US programs in style. Several publicly available rankings aided
our search for candidate programs. Our procedure resulted in a list of 21 programs. Of
these, 5 are located in the United Kingdom (Cambridge, LSE, Oxford, UCL, Warwick), 4
in Spain (Autonoma Barcelona, Carlos III, CEMFI, UPF), 3 in Germany (Bonn, Frankfurt,
Mannheim), 2 in France (Paris School of Economics, Toulouse), 2 in Italy (Bocconi, EUI),
2 in the Netherlands (Tilburg, Tinbergen Institute), 2 in Sweden (IIES, Stockholm School
of Economics), and 1 in Switzerland (Zurich). We do not purport to establish that these are
the 21 best programs in Europe, nor would we want to rank them. But the list does include
2For more information on the economics job market, visit https://www.econjobmarket.org/index.php. The
organization describes itself as a ”non-profit clearinghouse for applications to PhD level jobs in economics.”
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all usual suspects for the top spots, so that we would certainly expect that, for example, the
top 10 programs (whichever they are) are included in this set.
Program Structure Table 3.1 provides some information on program structure for each
of the European programs. Generally, the setup of these programs is very similar to that of
US programs: they consist of a coursework phase, where the first year consists of core courses
and the second year consists of electives and moves students towards the research frontier.
The balance between courses and initial research in the second year varies from program to
program, while the first year programs are largely standard and very similar to those in US
programs.
There is one big difference in setup to US programs: in many of the European programs, the
coursework phase is treated as a separate degree program, and leads to titles such as MPhil
or MRes. Thus, in some of these programs PhD students are just a subset of a masters degree
class for the first one or two years (for example CEMFI), while others are entirely integrated
as in a US-style system (for example EUI). Further detail is provided in Table 3.1.
In all programs under consideration, coursework is targeted at future PhD researchers. Why
then offer this coursework for a terminal masters degree as well? We suspect that this is
largely due to the current setup of European academia and the structure of public funding for
higher education. Following the Bologna process, the typical European student completes a
3-year Bachelors degree in his field of interest, followed by a 1- or 2-year Masters degree. State
funding (most of the programs are housed by public institutions) is often structured the same
way, where it is beneficial to have class sizes above the typical number of students in a PhD
program. Thus, economics departments fit the ’ideal’ US type program into the European
system by making the coursework phase a Masters degree. In addition, some programs use
this to select the best students from a large pool that undergoes initial coursework (for
example UPF). The demands that first-year coursework places on students leads to the
admission of mostly (or in some cases exclusively) students who already completed a ’regular’
Master’s degree elsewhere, sometimes in the same university.
One possibility that the above structure raises is that students might switch programs when
they enter the research phase. We find that such switching is exceedingly rare. While it occurs
that students take Masters degree in one of these programs and then enter another, they
then typically retake the entire coursework phase of their new program. Summarizing all
of this, we concluded that these two-step programs can safely be considered PhD programs
with a coursework component, similar to their US counterparts.
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Program Funding There are large differences in funding from program to program as
well. Not too dissimilar from the US, all of these programs can in principle fund students
through the entire length of a PhD. However, in some cases funding is insecure from year to
year, or only provided in return for teaching and research assistantships. Finally, there are
large differences in the availability of funding across any one cohort, with some programs
providing funding to all admitted (for example SSE) and others separating the admission
decision from the funding decision entirely (for example Cambridge and Oxford).
An important difference to fully integrated US PhD programs arises in the European pro-
grams that separate their course phase into a stand-alone master degree. Here, the majority
of the programs do not provide funding for the master stage. Funding is then restricted to
the research phase of the PhD, following the initial one or two years of coursework.
3.3 Data Collection and Processing
Data collection proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, we looked up current job market
candidates for each program (this was in 2015-2016) and placement results of past job mar-
kets (2011-2012 through 2014-2015) online, whenever data were available. We searched for
each candidate’s CV using personal websites, professional websites, and LinkedIn profiles.
This led to some, but very limited, missing data for students who are listed as job market
candidates but whose entry dates cannot be established.
In the second stage (in the Summer of 2017), we collected job market outcomes and addi-
tional covariates per candidate. Job market outcomes were codified for ’quality’ as follows.
Outcomes were classified in three different classes, academic, institutional or private sector.
Within each class of placements, we assigned specific institutions as member of the Top,
Middle or Low group of institutions within that class. For academic institutions, we made
use of the IDEAS/REPEC ranking of Top Economics Institutions, as of June 2017, to assign
universities to groups.3 For institutional jobs, we ranked prominent international institu-
tions such as IMF, ECB or Worldbank, and top national institutions of large countries (Fed,
Banque de France etc.) as Top, less prominent international institutions as Middle and na-
tional institutions of smaller countries as Low. For private sector jobs, our decision rule was
based on international reputation of the company, without resorting to a formal criterion.
While the IDEAS/REPEC ranking is just one of many possible academic rankings, it is
easily accessible, computed based on transparent rules and comprehensive in coverage. In
addition to the institutional quality ranking just discussed, we created a job quality ranking
depending on the job title of the first placement job.
3The current ranking can be accessed via https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.inst.all.html. The ranking is
updated continuously, so the current rankings might differ slightly from the ones we used for our analysis.
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Additional covariates collected include gender, field (codified as micro, macro, applied,
econometrics, or finance), fields of undergraduate studies (economics, business, natural sci-
ences/engineering, social sciences/humanities), age, and nationality. (Data on the latter two
turned out to be missing in many cases, so that we did not use them for analysis.) We also
returned to our original sources and compared reported placements for 2016 versus the list
of names that was reported to be on the market in 2015-2016. This gives us a clear idea
of the extent to which collecting reported past candidates is representative of actual past
candidates. We discuss these results below.
As we explain above, we focus on candidates that enter the international job market at
the end of their PhD. Delivering competitive candidates to this job market is the stated
goal of most programs in our sample. Our approach makes our data more reliable and more
comparable to US data on completion times than European data from official sources would
be. European programs differ strongly in how they account for coursework time and time
spent on the job market (which is sometimes after defense), as we described above. Therefore,
a detail-oriented approach and knowledge of the program structure is necessary to attribute
the right de-facto number of years to the time spend in a PhD program.
We determined each candidate’s entry year into the program. Our measure for completion
time, time to job market, is the difference between the job market year and the entry year.
We include the relevant course period and the time spent on the job market. The measure
is not dependent on the timing of the defense.
3.4 Sample Selection and Representativeness
The attempt of this paper is, in first instance, to compare European job market candidates
to their North American counterparts. The main selection issue that our method of data
collection faces is whether reported past job market candidates (placements) correspond to
actual past job market placements. Here, two issues might occur. First, candidates might be
added to placement lists when they get jobs outside of the academic job market. Second,
candidates who do not place well or not at all may not be reported among past placements.
As mentioned above, our two-staged data collection approach allows us to examine this issue
for the 2015-2016 job market. We found the former issue to be minor, and therefore do not
report it. The latter issue is somewhat more prevalent, although only in some programs.
We report the results in Table 3.2 below. In one case (UPF) a university stopped reporting
placements altogether. For a couple, job market candidates were not yet listed during our
first stage of data collection.
This issue, while relevant to prospective students, is most relevant to our research setup if it
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influences our results on completion time significantly. It turns out that the issue is minor:
those who are listed as placements took on average 6.05 years by our measure, while those
that were not reported as placements took 5.90 years.
Another issue is missing data. For few programs, one or several years of job market data are
missing. Typically these are recent (Cambridge, Warwick, and Zurich) or older years (UCL,
UPF, Warwick), or years for which a smaller program did not deliver job market candidates
(CEMFI). However, we do not believe that this influences our conclusions with regards to
completion time.
Importantly, we do not claim that our sample is a representation of entering students: Some
may drop out or be asked to leave at various stages. Some students may not enter the job
market and therefore go unlisted on websites. For the EUI, we have access to administrative
data on all PhDs awarded. On average, about half of the PhD recipients go on the Academic
Job Market and are publicly listed as such. For the years 2012 to 2015, the average job
market candidate took a quarter of a year longer to obtain their degree than the average
degree recipient. While these are interesting statistics, they are not relevant to our research
setup.
3.5 Results
Completion Times Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 below contain our results on completion
times. Average and median completion times have been rising since 2013. Both the average
(Table 3.3) and median (Table 3.4) are at 6 years for the 2016 job market cohorts. This finding
is remarkably consistent across programs, with both averages and medians lying between
5 and 7 years for all programs. We miss information for a few years for some programs
(whenever the reported number of observations is zero in Table 3.5), but our overall number
of observations is large at 736. We do not observe qualitative changes to our results when
calculating observation-weighted averages (Table 3.6).
To provide some further insights, Figure 3.1 provides a histogram of completion times across
all programs for the last two years in our sample. Completion times are rather concentrated
around 6 years. While 5 and 7 years of completion time also occur frequently, almost no
students finish in 4 years or less.
Covariates of Completion Times We report results from an ordered probit model re-
gressing Time to Job Market (completion time) on Year of Job Market, Field of Economics,
Gender, PhD Institution and Field of Undergraduate Studies, estimated with robust stan-
dard errors. For each covariate presented, we report the probability of observing a certain
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Time to Job Market for each level of the covariates, holding all other covariates at their
respective sample means. Confidence intervals shown are 95 percent confidence intervals.
The probabilities of observing particular completion times for each year of the sample are
shown in Figure 3.2. This confirms the raw completion times results reported in Tables 3.3
through 3.6. Completion in 6 or 7 years becomes significantly more likely over the sample
period, with 6 years being significantly more likely in 2015 and 2016, the opposite of what
is observed in the early sample years. Going on the job market in the 4th year of the PhD,
while still likely in 2009 and 2010, is becoming increasingly unlikely towards the end of the
sample.
Figure 3.3 shows that completion times of female candidates are slightly longer than their
male counterparts, however the differences are not statistically significant. Figure 3.4 shows
that the same is true for PhD candidates in different subfields of economics.
Covariates of Placement Quality We estimate a similar model to the one above, this
time using our placement quality index as dependent variable, pooled over all classes of
placement. In addition to the covariates reported above, we also include Time to Job Market
as an additional explanatory variable. An important qualification to stress is that this does
not allow us to infer any causal link from completion time to placement quality and that
the reported association is purely statistical in nature. Results reported are obtained in the
same way as in the previous subsection.
Figure 3.5 shows probabilities of placing in a top, middle or low ranked job within the
sample graduating in 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8 years. While for a duration of 4 or 5 years, all placement
qualities are statistically equally likely, going on the job market after 6 years is associated
with a significantly higher probability of placing in a top ranked job relative to a middle or
low ranked one. This effect attenuates again for graduates with a duration above 6 years.
Figure 3.6 plots the average completion time and placement quality for graduates of each
PhD-granting institution in the sample. As is apparent from the figure, average completion
time and average placement quality are associated positively in the sample. While, as already
mentioned above, this does not suggest that longer completion times are causing better
placement, it is a clear indicator that high quality candidates are taking additional time to
go on the job market. Since placing their candidates well is the stated goal of the departments
in our sample, this has implications for the desired funding structure of their PhD programs.
Figure 3.7 shows that Gender does not vary significantly with placement quality. Since
comparing placement quality by subfield of economics is not particularly meaningful, we
instead report placement quality by undergraduate background of PhD candidates in Figure
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3.8. While there is no statistical difference between candidates that have a background in
Economics, Business, Natural Sciences or Engineering, candidates with a social science or
humanities background place significantly worse relative to the other backgrounds. We view
this as evidence for the importance of sufficient formal training.
Assistant Professor Subsample Since the primary goal of many PhD programs is
preparing candidates for a career in Academics, we present some additional results on the
subsample of candidates with a first placement job title as ’Assistant Professor’.
Sample frequencies for the completion times of this subsample are presented in Figure 3.9.
The relative frequency of 6 vs 5 years of completion times is skewed in favor of 6 years,
with 29 vs 46 percent. This compares to relative frequencies of 32 vs 39 percent of the
entire sample. Figure 3.10 shows that placing at a top-ranked university is unlikely for all
durations, but point estimates are slightly increasing from 5 to 7 years of time to completion.4
Comparing top placement probability changes across subsamples of different duration reveals
insignificant estimates (Figure 3.11). However, when plotting average placement institution’s
quality and average completion times for the assistant professor subsample, there is again a
positive correlation. This relationship is plotted in Figure 3.12.
Taken together, results the subsample of ’Assistant Professor’ confirm the impression of
the full sample analysis: While the results and estimates presented do not allow for causal
interpretation, statistically completion times and placement quality are positively related.
3.6 Conclusion
Recent years have seen an increasing convergence of economics PhD Programs in Europe
to their US counterparts. Completion times in the top programs have steadily risen to, and
now reached, a median of 6 years. This brings them rather close to completion times in
US programs as surveyed by Stock et al. (2009) and Stock and Siegfried (2014). However,
program and funding structures remain different due to institutional factors. Our findings
may therefore be of relevance to funding authorities and administrators.
Our results suggest that higher placement quality is statistically associated with longer com-
pletion times. In addition, we uncover a number of facts relating completion times and
placement quality to personal researcher characteristics. The data do not show evidence of
systematic differences by gender in either the duration or the placement quality of Euro-
pean economics PhD programs. On the other hand, undergraduate background turns out to
4Only 23 candidates place as Assistant Professors after a completing their PhD in 4 or less years, which
makes interpretation of the estimated probabilities for those subsamples difficult.
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be a significant predictor of success in an economics PhD program, if measured by initial
placement quality.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Program Details
UAB The Graduate Program consists of a two-year Master in Economic Analysis,
followed by a research phase. The entire path is counted.
Bocconi The program is officially described as a four year program, with the first two
years dedicated to course work. However, our analysis shows that candidates
take substantially longer to finish their PhD.
Bonn The program is structured into 4 years, of which the first two are mainly course
work. Time can be extended into the fifth year for the academic job market.
Cambridge The full program is split into a one-year MPhil (coursework) phase and a PhD
phase (research). Both are counted as time to completion.
Carlos III The Graduate Program consists of a two-year Master in Economic Analysis,
followed by a three year PhD in Economics. Sufficient performance of the
former provides entry to the latter. The entire path is counted.
CEMFI The PhD program starts out with two years of coursework, which is taken
jointly with a master’s program. Some master’s students subsequently enroll
as PhD students. In either case, the entire path is counted.
EUI Program is entirely standardized, with coursework as part of the PhD program.
There was a small terminal master’s program in the past consisting of part of
the same coursework.
Frankfurt The program is officially described as a four year program, with the first two
years dedicated to course work. However, our analysis shows that candidates
take substantially longer to finish their PhD.
IIES The PhD program is organized jointly with the Department of Economics of
the University of Stockholm. Entry into IIES is competitive out of the program.
We count the full time spent in the PhD program, also if part of it was spent
outside of the IIES.
LSE The full program is split into a two-year MRes (coursework) phase and a PhD
phase (research). Some who obtained a previous master’s degree (usually a
terminal MSc from LSE) may be allowed to complete the MRes in one year
instead of two. Both the time spent on the MRes and the PhD phase are
counted as time to completion, but previous degrees are not.
Mannheim The program lasts 5 years, of which the first two years are course work. Funding
is committed for the entire period.
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Oxford The full program is split into a two-year Mphil (coursework) phase and a DPhil
phase (research). Both are counted as time to completion.
Paris SE The Paris School of Economics (PSE) is a collection of Economics departments
in Paris. PhD candidates from these schools are listed as PhD candidates of
PSE. Three different subsets of this set of schools each jointly offer a master’s
degree, which consists of one year of core coursework (the Master 1) and one
year of advanced coursework (the Master 2). Subsequently, students may be
admitted to a PhD program. The entire path is counted.
SSE The program starts with a two year course phase after which two to three years
of research follow.
Tilburg The five-year graduate program consists of a two-year Research Master and a
three-year PhD program. The entire path is counted.
Tinbergen The Tinbergen Institute is a joint graduate school and research institute of
the Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam, and the
Free University Amsterdam, Netherlands. Tinbergen offers a two-year MPhil
degree, after which students can be offered doctoral positions in one of the
three universities. The three universities also hire PhD students for four year
positions that do not require formal coursework (further to previous degrees),
and some of these are listed as Tinbergen placements. Because we cannot
distinguish between the two, we list all students that the Tinbergen Institute
lists and count time spent in the MPhil as well.
Toulouse The TSE doctoral program consists of a Master 2 (French university system) in
Econometric Theory and Econometrics, which is explicitly part of the ’doctoral
track’, a DEEQA degree, which is essentially the second year of coursework,
and a research phase. The entire path is counted.
UCL The program is structured into MRes. (one year, coursework), MPhil. (sec-
ond year, research) and PhD (following two years). Thereafter, students have
another year to complete their thesis with full student status.
UPF The typical path towards a PhD at UPF includes one year of core courses in
an MSc program, one year of advanced courses in an Mphil program, and then
a research phase. While the MSc is also a large terminal degree (at least with
respect to UPF), it is part of the core sequence of courses for a UPF PhD.
Thus, the entire path is counted.
Warwick The program is structured into a two-year MRes. followed by a 4 year PhD
(total: 2+4). Students should submit towards the end of year 3 of the PhD and
go on the job market in year 4.
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Zurich The program has a two year course phase followed by a research phase which
is not formally structured.
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Table 3.2: Percentage of reported job market candidates eventually listed as placements for
the Academic year 2015/16
Percentage listed 2016
EUI 100%
LSE 100%
Oxford 43%
Cambridge
UPF 0%
Carlos III 100%
Toulouse 100%
Paris SE 100%
Tinbergen 75%
Tilburg 13%
Autonoma Barcelona 86%
CEMFI 100%
UCL 83%
Warwick
Zurich
Bonn 89%
Mannheim 92%
IIES 100%
SSE 25%
Bocconi 100%
Frankfurt 83%
Average 77%
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Table 3.3: Average Time to Job Market (years)
Program 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Autonoma Barcelona 6.00 6.20 5.50 6.00 6.14 5.97
Bocconi 6.50 5.88 6.20 6.86 5.80 6.25
Bonn 4.80 5.38 5.67 4.75 5.56 5.23
Cambridge 4.80 5.33 5.67 5.27
Carlos III 5.89 6.29 5.67 5.56 5.50 5.78
CEMFI 5.75 6.50 6.20 6.00 6.11
EUI 4.45 4.75 5.18 4.89 5.10 4.88
Frankfurt 5.44 5.60 5.78 5.75 6.00 5.71
IIES 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.60 6.32
LSE 6.31 5.79 6.79 6.14 6.30 6.27
Mannheim 5.60 5.00 5.38 5.78 5.75 5.50
Oxford 6.14 5.31 5.50 5.56 6.14 5.73
Paris SE 6.13 6.00 6.00 6.27 6.30 6.14
SSE 6.00 5.50 5.50 5.33 6.00 5.67
Tilburg 4.80 5.50 5.15
Tinbergen 5.32 4.93 5.44 5.39 5.94 5.40
Toulouse 5.70 5.50 5.75 6.60 6.80 6.07
UCL 6.56 6.29 6.42 6.42
UPF 5.50 6.50 6.00
Warwick 5.64 5.50 6.00 5.71
Zurich 4.00 5.00 5.20 7.50 5.43
Average 5.58 5.49 5.78 5.97 6.02 5.76
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Table 3.4: Median Time to Job Market (years)
Program 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Autonoma Barcelona 6 6 6 6 6 5.90
Bocconi 7 6 6 6 6 6.10
Bonn 5 5 5 5 6 5.20
Cambridge 4 5 6 5.00
Carlos III 6 6 6 6 6 5.90
CEMFI 6 7 6 6 6.13
EUI 4 5 5 5 5 4.80
Frankfurt 6 6 6 6 6 5.90
IIES 6 6 6 7 7 6.40
LSE 6 6 7 6 6 6.20
Mannheim 5 5 5 6 6 5.40
Oxford 6 5 6 5 6 5.60
Paris SE 6 6 6 6 6 6.00
SSE 6 5 5 5 6 5.40
Tilburg 5 6 5.50
Tinbergen 5 5 5 5 6 5.20
Toulouse 6 6 6 7 7 6.10
UCL 6 6 7 6.17
UPF 6 6 5.75
Warwick 6 6 6 5.83
Zurich 4 5 5 8 5.38
Average 5.50 5.47 5.68 5.84 6.06 5.71
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Table 3.5: Number of observations
Program 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Autonoma Barcelona 7 10 4 2 7 30
Bocconi 4 8 5 7 5 29
Bonn 5 8 9 4 9 35
Cambridge 5 6 3 0 0 14
Carlos III 9 7 9 9 4 38
CEMFI 4 0 2 5 1 12
EUI 11 12 11 9 10 53
Frankfurt 9 5 9 8 6 37
IIES 1 7 1 1 5 15
LSE 16 14 14 21 10 75
Mannheim 5 5 13 9 12 44
Oxford 7 16 6 9 7 45
Paris SE 8 9 6 11 10 44
SSE 5 6 6 3 4 24
Tilburg 0 5 0 0 8 13
Tinbergen 25 15 25 31 16 112
Toulouse 10 2 8 10 10 40
UCL 0 0 9 7 12 28
UPF 0 0 0 10 6 16
Warwick 0 11 6 6 0 23
Zurich 1 1 5 2 0 9
Total 132 147 151 164 142 736
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Table 3.6: Observation Weighted Average Time to Job Market
Program 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average
Autonoma Barcelona 6.00 6.20 5.50 6.00 6.14 6.03
Bocconi 6.50 5.88 6.20 6.86 5.80 6.24
Bonn 4.80 5.38 5.67 4.75 5.56 5.34
Cambridge 4.80 5.33 5.67 5.21
Carlos III 5.89 6.29 5.67 5.56 5.50 5.79
CEMFI 5.75 6.50 6.20 6.00 6.08
EUI 4.45 4.75 5.18 4.89 5.10 4.87
Frankfurt 5.44 5.60 5.78 5.75 6.00 5.70
IIES 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.60 6.27
LSE 6.31 5.79 6.79 6.14 6.30 6.25
Mannheim 5.60 5.00 5.38 5.78 5.75 5.55
Oxford 6.14 5.31 5.50 5.56 6.14 5.64
Paris SE 6.13 6.00 6.00 6.27 6.30 6.16
SSE 6.00 5.50 5.50 5.33 6.00 5.67
Tilburg 4.80 5.50 5.23
Tinbergen 5.32 4.93 5.44 5.39 5.94 5.40
Toulouse 5.70 5.50 5.75 6.60 6.80 6.20
UCL 6.56 6.29 6.42 6.43
UPF 5.50 6.50 5.88
Warwick 5.64 5.50 6.00 5.70
Zurich 4.00 5.00 5.20 7.50 5.56
Average 5.61 5.50 5.74 5.83 6.02 5.77
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Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
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Figure 3.3
Figure 3.4
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Figure 3.5
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Figure 3.6
Note: The figure plots the average completion time against the average rank of the first
position for graduates of each PhD-granting institution in the sample.
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Figure 3.7
Figure 3.8
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Figure 3.9
Figure 3.10
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Figure 3.11
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Figure 3.12
Note: The figure plots average completion time against average rank of hiring institution
for graduates of each PhD-granting institution in the sample.
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